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Introduction 
1. 	 The Secretary of State for Education’s remit letter to the School Teachers’ Review 
Body (STRB) on 21 February 2012 set out his objective of reforming teachers’ pay in 
order to raise the status of the profession and contribute to improving the standard of 
teaching in our schools. He invited the STRB to review the current provisions for 
teachers’ pay and referred the following matters: 
 how the pay framework for teachers should best be made more market 
facing in local areas 
 how the pay scales, including the main and upper pay scales, should be 
reformed to more effectively link pay and performance, including 
arrangements for progression 
 what other reforms should be made to teachers’ pay and conditions in order 
to raise the status of the profession and best support the recruitment and 
retention of high-quality teachers in all schools   
2. 	 Given the importance of teachers and school leaders in improving standards and 
attainment, the Secretary of State’s objectives for reform of teachers’ pay are: 
 to develop arrangements for teachers’ pay which reward good performance 
and attract the highest performing graduates and professionals into the 
profession 
 to give schools as much freedom as possible to spend their money as they 
see fit to meet their pupils’ needs  
 to ensure the best teachers are incentivised to work in the most challenging
schools
 to provide the best value for money for the tax payer and to ensure that the 
individual decisions of head teachers and governing bodies do not result in 
overall cost inflation in the system and that there are arrangements to 
maintain propriety in these decisions 
3. 	 This document provides the Secretary of State’s evidence to support the STRB’s 
consideration of these issues. 
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The importance of improving the quality of the 
teaching workforce 
4. 	 The quality of an education system cannot exceed the quality of its teachers or 
school leaders. The available evidence suggests that the main driver of variation 
in student achievement at school is the quality of the teachers. Analysis of English 
data by Slater, Davies and Burgess (2009) showed that being taught by a high-
quality teacher rather than a low-quality teacher adds 0.425 of a GCSE point per 
subject to a pupil’s attainment1. Furthermore, a Department for Education and 
Skills (DfES) study (Day et al., 2006) found that in Years 6 and 9, 15-30 per cent 
of the variance in pupils’ progress in mathematics and English was associated 
with the teacher, after controlling for pupil background and prior attainment.  In 
terms of pupil progress, the influence of the teacher was more important than 
pupils’ background characteristics. 
5. 	 Barber and Mourshed (2007) suggest good leaders employ good teachers and 
facilitate the development of their skills. Research also suggests that ‘school 
leadership is second only to classroom teaching as an influence on pupil learning’ 
(Leithwood et al, 2006). It indicates that without an effective head teacher, a 
school is unlikely to have a culture of high expectations or strive for continuous 
improvement. 
6. 	 The effects of high-quality teaching are especially significant for pupils from 
disadvantaged backgrounds: over a school year, these pupils gain 1.5 years’ 
worth of education with very effective teachers, compared with 0.5 years with 
poorly performing teachers. In other words, for poor pupils, the difference between 
a very good teacher and a bad teacher may be a whole year’s worth of education 
(The Sutton Trust, 2011). 
7. 	 International evidence (Annex E) shows the top-performing school systems 
consistently attract more able people into the teaching profession, leading to better 
pupil outcomes (Barber and Mourshed, 2007). They do this by making entry to 
teacher training highly selective, developing effective processes for selecting the 
right applicants to become teachers, and paying appropriate starting 
compensation. Getting these essentials right drives up the status of the teaching 
profession, enabling it to attract even better candidates. 
8. 	 OECD evidence (Schleicher, 2011) suggests that teacher quality is improved 
where appraisal feedback systems which provide effective incentives to teachers, 
reward good performance and provide development opportunities are supported 
by the school’s leadership. Performance management of this kind (used for 
example in Finland and Ontario) improves teachers’ practices by identifying 
strengths and weaknesses requiring further professional development, allowing 
teachers to reflect on their practice. It also serves to hold teachers accountable for 
enhancing pupils’ education.   
9. 	 Improving the quality of both new and existing teachers is therefore a priority in the 
drive to raise educational standards in our schools.   
1 To put this into context, 6 points is the difference between one GCSE grade in one subject i.e. the difference between 
an A-grade and a B-grade in mathematics or the difference between a D-grade and an E-grade in history.
4 

 The case for change 
10. 	 Reform of the current pay system for teachers is fundamental to driving up teacher 
quality. The current pay system is rigid, complex and difficult to navigate and does 
not support schools to recruit and retain the high-quality teachers or leaders they 
need to address specific shortages and benefit their pupils.  
11. 	 Ensuring there are enough teachers, and that those teachers are of the best 
quality, is critical to driving up standards in our schools. To achieve this, the 
Government sets targets at a national level for recruitment of the very best 
graduates to Initial Teacher Training (ITT) and is strengthening the arrangements 
for managing teachers’ performance. 
12. 	 It is, however, the decisions taken by schools, governors and head teachers which 
have the biggest impact on the supply and demand for teachers. The existing 
national system of teachers’ pay does not routinely support schools to recruit the 
high-quality teachers they need to meet the needs of their pupils.  
The current system and its effect on teacher quality 
Rewarding good performance 
13. 	 The current arrangements for pay progression set out in Annex A limit a school’s 
ability to use its pay bill effectively and creatively to raise standards.  In a system 
where pay progression is awarded to the great majority of teachers, the 
association between performance and reward is weak. 
14. 	 Equally, under the current system pay progression becomes primarily a reward for 
time served. This could undermine the efforts of those teachers who innovate, are 
high performing and drive improvement in the quality of education in our schools. 
15. 	 Teachers’ pay in maintained schools in England and Wales is currently set at a 
national level with four area pay bands as set out in the School Teachers’ Pay and 
Conditions Document (STPCD). Annex A describes a range of pay scales and 
allowances which relevant bodies use.  
16. 	 The overall level of teachers’ pay varies between schools as the evidence in 
Annex B demonstrates. However, almost every teacher on the main pay scale in 
the current pay system progresses to a higher spine point each year. ORC 
Research (2009) on behalf of the Office of Manpower Economics (OME) found 
that virtually all full time classroom teachers on the main pay scale in primary 
schools progressed to the next point and a similar pattern was found for 
secondary school teachers. 49 per cent of qualified classroom teachers across all 
pay scales were on a higher spine point than in the previous year. 
17. 	 Given that high quality teachers drive up pupils’ achievement, it is crucial that the 
pay system enables head teachers to reward the best teachers who can have the 
biggest impact on pupil outcomes. 
18. 	 The introduction from 1 September 2012 of the new Appraisal Regulations and the 
Teachers’ Standards will provide a better framework for schools to make decisions 
about rewarding teacher performance. Under the new arrangements, teachers will 
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 have to be assessed each year against the relevant standards and their 
objectives. 
19. 	 The second report of the independent Teachers’ Standards Review Group 
recommended that the existing standards for post-threshold, Excellent Teachers 
(ETs) and Advanced Skills Teachers should be discontinued and that a new 
Master Teacher Standard should be introduced. The Review Group did not 
envisage that the Master Teacher Standard should be linked to pay. However, the 
removal of the existing higher level pay standards and the introduction of a 
minimum and an aspirational standard describing those top performing teachers
should give schools greater freedom to use their professional judgement to 
determine how they reward teacher performance in the context of their objectives 
and their wider contribution to the school. The STRB is invited to consider the 
removal of the existing standards in making its recommendations on the options 
for greater flexibility in the system. 
Recruiting the best 
20. 	 Interest amongst good graduates in teaching careers is improving. The latest 
figures for recruitment to ITT forecast that in 2012/13 we are on course to meet 
recruitment targets in all subjects for the first time. There are numerous factors 
that affect the supply of teachers and the demand for their professional services. 
The pool of potential trainee teachers is influenced by economic factors such as 
the state of the wider economy, pay and conditions relative to other professional 
occupations, and perceptions of the challenges of being a teacher, such as 
managing pupil behaviour. Pay is one of a number of factors that are known to 
influence whether individuals choose to enter the teaching profession and 
continue to work as teachers. Offering salaries in line with other graduate 
professions is critical to ensuring that high-quality graduates are attracted into and 
retained within the teaching profession.  
21. 	 Annex C highlights the issue of teacher shortages across different regions of the 
country, within local authority areas and within the teaching of specific subjects. 
There are also variable rates of teacher unemployment across different regions of 
the country. Research highlighted in Annex C suggests that vacancy rates are 
associated with the public-private pay differentials and that the current pay system 
creates inequality in relative pay. 
22. 	 Recruitment and retention issues have a direct impact on the quality of education 
experienced by children and young people, particularly in challenging schools. The 
Education Select Committee report (2003-2004) stated “high turnover, and the 
inability of some schools to recruit sufficient high calibre teachers, has a knock on 
effect on the achievement of pupils in those schools. Turnover within the 
profession may not be a significant issue for schools in general; but for those 
schools in the most ‘challenging’ circumstances it can exacerbate an already 
difficult situation.” 
23. 	 Allowing head teachers to use the pay system to attract high-quality teachers is 
particularly important given the effects high-quality teaching can have on pupil 
outcomes. It is crucial that schools have the ability to respond to local labour 
markets to attract and retain good teachers. 
24. 	 The Pupil Premium is worth £1.25bn in 2012-13, or £600 per eligible pupil, and will 
rise to £2.5bn by 2014-15. It is targeted at pupils from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, who generally have lower levels of educational attainment. Head 
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teachers can decide how to use the Pupil Premium to support these children and 
to reduce educational inequalities. Giving schools greater flexibilities over how 
they use their budgets would give head teachers the opportunity to incentivise and 
reward the best teachers to work in the most disadvantaged schools to help raise 
the attainment of these pupils. 
25. 	 Attracting and retaining the best head teachers is also crucial to achieving 
improvements in schools. The 2010 School Workforce Census found that 0.1 per 
cent of head teacher posts were vacant and 2.4 per cent of head teacher posts 
were filled on a temporary basis. As the ‘baby boomer generation’ reach 
retirement age some one in four heads will be eligible to retire over the next four 
years and over half in the next ten years. In 2010, 30 per cent of heads were aged 
55 plus compared to 19 per cent in 2002. This shows that there is an urgent need 
to address the recruitment and retention of high-quality school leaders in the 
coming years. 
26. 	 The re-advertisement rate in the primary sector was 28 per cent in 2010-11 
(NAHT, 2011). It has been high for a number of years. It is higher in primary 
schools than in secondary schools (19 per cent). The overall re-advertisement rate 
for Roman Catholic Schools is 40 per cent and 27 per cent for Church of England 
schools. Faith schools experience difficulty at all stages of the recruitment 
process; this is especially true for many Roman Catholic schools, where the 
appointment rates were lower than any other school type. All figures have 
increased from the previous year, suggesting that more schools are having 
problems finding new head teachers. 
27. 	 The current national pay scales mean schools in some parts of the country 
struggle to recruit and retain good teachers and head teachers. 52 per cent of 
head teachers in research conducted bv ORC International (2011) on behalf of the 
Office of Manpower Economics (OME) felt that the current allowances do not 
sufficiently cater for the need to reward high performance. Although there is some 
flexibility in the existing pay arrangements, as outlined in Annex B, more than one 
third of head teachers in maintained schools in England do not make use of any.  
28. 	 Academies have greater freedom over how they use their budgets. They have the 
ability to set their own pay and conditions for staff and do not have to comply with 
the STPCD. Despite this, Bassett et al (2012) found that 65 per cent of Academies 
have not altered staff terms and conditions and have no plans to do so. This may 
not be due to a lack of appetite for pay flexibility.  
29. 	 There is limited evidence on how independent schools pay teachers. We would 
welcome any additional research the STRB can do in this area. 
30. 	 Freeing up the pay system in a way which enables decisions to be taken at a more 
local level would allow head teachers to allocate resources more efficiently and 
attract the right teachers.  
Achieving the best value for money 
31. 	 The current pay system does not allow for local circumstances, either those of the 
school or the local labour market, to influence rates of pay. The Government’s 
evidence on the ‘Economics of Local Pay’ sets out the existence of pay premia 
which suggest that the public sector sometimes pays more than is necessary to 
recruit, retain and motivate staff in some areas. Across regions there are variable 
pay premia which have an impact on teacher vacancy rates. This suggests that 
teachers are less attracted to areas where pay is low in comparison to the private 
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sector and where the cost of living is high. Annexes C and D show that teacher 
vacancy rates are commensurately higher in such areas. 
32. 	 National pay scales mean schools in some parts of the country struggle to recruit 
and retain good teachers, while others may be paying salaries which are 
significantly above local professional pay levels. The current four area pay bands 
do not help schools with this problem but rather contribute to local variations in 
supply and demand (as shown in Annex C). 
33. 	 Within the national teacher labour market, there are a number of overlapping 
teacher labour markets. These overlapping teacher labour markets vary locally, as 
well as between different groups in the teaching workforce (such as primary and 
secondary teachers). 
34. 	 The mismatch between the national system and local labour market conditions
means that pay is unlikely to reflect those conditions. This can potentially lead to a 
teacher shortage in some areas and an over-supply of teachers in others. This can 
be illustrated by regional data on vacancy rates, turnover rates and unemployment 
rates for teachers relative to other graduates shown in Annex C.
35. 	 Vacancy rates suggest that there is significant variation not only at regional level 
but also between schools within the same local authority area as illustrated in 
Annex C. The majority of local authorities have schools that have very low 
vacancy rates and individual schools that have very high vacancy rates. A small 
number of local authorities experience extreme polarisation, with the majority of 
schools having very low vacancy rates but a minority of schools within the same 
local authority having very high vacancy rates, suggesting the existence of 
challenges at an individual school level in recruiting and retaining teachers which 
are not being addressed.  
36. 	 This variance in teacher vacancy rates not only across regions, but also across 
schools in a single local authority area, suggests that a more flexible local-facing 
pay structure could support more effective recruitment and retention of teachers. It 
is also possible that a greater degree of local-facing pay might encourage greater 
movement of good teachers into areas experiencing high levels of vacancies or 
vacancies in particular subject areas. This is particularly important for schools in 
challenging circumstances that can struggle to attract the best quality teachers 
who can make the greatest difference to their pupils. 
37. 	 Regional variations in the unemployment rate amongst teachers can also be used 
as an indicator of regional variations in supply and demand. For example, the gap 
between unemployment rates amongst teachers and other degree holders varies 
markedly across regions (Annex C). This also suggests that there is an under-
supply of teachers in some areas and an over-supply in others. The evidence in 
Annex D highlights that it is harder to recruit and retain teachers in areas where 
the pay is lower relative to that of private sector professionals and where costs of 
living are higher. 
38. 	 As shown in Annex D, there are disparities between teachers’ pay and private 
sector pay which vary widely across local authorities, with pay levels for teachers 
appearing generous relative to private sector professionals in some local 
authorities and not comparing favourably in others.  
39. 	 Differences in the cost of living between regions as set out in Annex D may make 
some regions more attractive to teach in than others. This can lead to teacher 
shortages in areas with a high cost of living, as under a national framework 
teachers’ pay cannot adjust accordingly. Evidence in Annex D shows that teachers 
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working in local authorities closer to London earn relatively lower salaries with 
respect to the cost of living compared to those in the Rest of England and Wales 
pay band (although there are some exceptions within the Rest of England).  
40. 	 The East of England, London and the South East have had above average 
turnover rates in recent years. The North East has consistently had the lowest 
staff turnover rates (evidence in Annex C).   
41. 	 A competitive salary, in line with other local graduate professions, is critical to 
ensuring that high-quality graduates are attracted into and retained within the 
teaching profession across the country. In areas where teachers’ pay is low 
compared to private sector professionals and the local cost of living, there is a risk 
that those considering teaching will not enter the profession, or enter and then 
leave to take up higher-paying non-teaching posts. In either case, this does not 
make best use of resources, both by failing to attract the potential high-quality
teachers that are required to raise standards and by wasting the resources 
invested in teacher training.
42. 	 Although pay is not the main or only motivation for teaching, it seems that unless 
the school system offers salaries in line with other local graduate salaries, the 
same graduates do not enter teaching.  
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Options 
43. 	 The table below describes five potential models for teachers’ pay, each of which 
has a number of variants. These include: 
 the level of prescription in national pay arrangements 
 whether to set a minimum and or maximum pay level 
 if there should be local pay zones, and if so: 
 whether to retain the current four pay areas 
 whether to define additional pay zones
 whether to define “hotspots” where disparities exist between and 
within local areas 
44. 	 The STRB should consider these with reference to the Secretary of State’s 
objectives for reform of teachers’ pay and the need to ensure equity and fairness.  
45. 	 These options encompass flexibility across all pay scales, including leadership 
scales, and all provisions in the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document, 
except non-pay related conditions of employment.  
Local pay areas and “hotspots” 
46. 	 In considering zones and “hotspots”, we believe it will be necessary for the STRB 
to consider appropriate boundaries and for those zones and hotspots to be subject 
to a programme of review. The frequency of review would depend on identifying 
and agreeing a suitable trigger; and on identifying robust data to support a review. 
47. 	 In considering a new zonal pay structure alongside the identification of appropriate 
boundaries, the following matters would need to be considered and addressed:
 How revised/new zones may impact on those neighbouring areas that are 
within daily travel to work distance of any higher-salaried zones or hotspots 
(cliff edges) and whether there is a need for additional ‘fringe’ areas around 
areas that have higher salary ranges. 
 Consideration of appropriate frequency for review of zones and hotspots or 
factors that would trigger a review e.g. de-minimus limits that if breached 
would prompt a review and consideration of how any model can be future 
proofed to accommodate changes resulting from demographics of teachers 
and pupils. 
 The great diversity amongst the 23,000+ maintained schools which serve a 
wide range of local communities in rural, suburban and inner-city areas, 
with significantly different numbers of pupils and budgets.  
48. 	 Analysis of regional variations in the local pay section (Annex B) identifies areas 
where potential disparities exist between and within local areas (and these are 
subject to change over time). This provides an indication of the number of 
zones/hotspots that may be required to address these disparities.  It also 
acknowledges that the use of a zonal model may not address all local market 
requirements at school level. 
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Capacity and governance 
49. 	 The STRB is asked, in considering all the options to reform the pay system, to 
have particular regard to considerations that include the need to make all 
recommendations affordable and the need to encourage consistent and 
reasonable pay arrangements. The degree to which different reforms to the pay 
system would meet those needs will depend on: 
(a) effective school governance arrangements, which support governing bodies 
and head teachers to make decisions about pay and progression and ensure 
propriety is maintained
(b) the support required by governing bodies and head teachers to make 
decisions about pay which represent value for money  
50. 	 While the STRB has not been asked to make explicit recommendations about 
whether Government should change its approach in either of these areas of policy, 
the STRB may wish to consider the implications for governance and support as 
part of its considerations of the various options for pay reform. 
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Model Description Advantages Disadvantages 
1 
Deregulation  
1A Complete 
deregulation 
including the 
removal of 
existing area pay
bands
Would remove all provisions in
the STPCD that relate to 
remuneration. 
Would provide head teachers and governing 
bodies with complete freedom and flexibility in 
setting the levels of all types of remuneration
Would grant schools ultimate capacity to adapt 
pay arrangements to accommodate local market-
facing pay fluctuations and any school specific
issues that may impact on the school’s ability to 
attract and retain high quality teachers
Could not oblige all schools to take account of the 
local labour market  
Some schools could fail to innovate 
Schools could pay qualified teachers at a 
significantly reduced rate  
Schools could need support to move from a 
prescriptive system to one which is so flexible, as 
capability to make fair, equitable and value for 
1B 
Deregulation 
within minimum 
Would provide head teachers 
and governing bodies with 
significant degree of pay 
and maximum flexibility but within the existing Would create maximum potential to free up money pay decisions could be variable
pay levels minimum of the pay scale for 
unqualified teachers in England 
and Wales and the maximum of 
the leadership group in Inner 
London. In addition, the STRB 
would need to consider if this 
budgets and allows schools to manage them 
more effectively.
Would allow schools that experience higher 
vacancy rates to redress the balance by offering 
salary rates that would attract suitable applicants  
Individual schools could interpret this model quite 
differently which could lead to wide-ranging 
differences in pay between the lowest and highest 
paid staff 
Could lead to excessive wage inflation if the 
minimum and maximum remain 
appropriate, and whether there 
should be circumstances in 
which schools should be
allowed to exceed the 
maximum.
Would remove the current rules around 
progression, allowing head teachers and 
governing bodies to make decisions that are 
better linked to performance
The need for a prescriptive set of allowances and 
payments in addition to the pay scale would be 
removed 
Schools could pay good teachers more, much 
earlier in their career 
Schools could utilise innovative pay options such 
appraisal system is not used robustly and there is 
no upper pay limit; if resources are not managed 
effectively at a school level; and/or as a result of 
competition between schools for staff 
Could require more transparent pay data than is 
currently used so schools can access relevant 
comparative data in order to set appropriate
market-facing salary levels and account for their 
decisions
1B’s maximum pay level would not accommodate 
1C
Deregulation 
within minimum 
pay level  
Further variant of 1B but with
no maximum.
as rewarding a team’s performance
Schools would not be constrained by the 
unqualified teachers’ pay scale in setting the pay 
of skilled professionals who do not hold QTS 
1B would provide a measure of control over any 
salary inflation to ensure a level of Value for 
Money and cost control in the setting of the 
highest levels of pay 
1B & 1C would retain a minimum, which 
evidence suggests is important for the status of 
the profession and ensuring a sufficient supply of 
quality graduates into teaching
the salaries of those members of the leadership 
group who earn more than the maximum of the 
Inner London pay scale
1B’s maximum pay level would be higher for all 
except those who work in Inner London which could 
lead to unrelated pay increases 
2 2A Deregulation Would provide head teachers Advantages are similar to Model 1. In addition... Disadvantages are similar to Model 1.  In addition... 
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Deregulation 
with pay 
zones
within set minima 
and maxima pay
levels of the 
current area pay 
bands
and governing bodies with a 
large degree of pay flexibility 
but within salary boundaries 
that are familiar to schools.
2A would mitigate the risk that there may be pay 
increases as a result of a new zonal pay 
structure that are unrelated to performance, by
retaining the current pay band areas
2B would ensure that schools have a  framework 
within which to set locally appropriate levels of
pay, minimising the risks  of there being 
insufficient capability and information 
Introducing higher minima in areas with a high 
cost of living and private sector wages would 
raise the status of the profession and improve 
2A would have less flexibility and may be less likely 
to respond to local needs 
2A would not resolve known issues with pay within 
and across all areas
2B would introduce new cliff edges which require a 
programme of review
2B would introduce new maxima, which if higher in
any areas could be seen as a target and lead to 
pressure to increase salary regardless of 
performance
2B New pay
zones and hot 
spots with 
deregulation in
between the set 
minima and 
maxima pay
Would provide head teachers 
and governing bodies with a 
large degree of pay flexibility. 
The Review Body would need 
to review the composition of 
existing pay bands; consider 
the need for new pay zones; 
levels determine the minima and 
maxima, and identify
appropriate hot spots.
recruitment Implementation of 2B could be costly if schools are 
required to review their zoning ‘position’ and their 
staff’s salaries
Introduction of greater number of pay zones could 
be divisive e.g. where a head teacher manages 
multiple schools in different pay zones
3 Three pay
scales with
deregulation 
in between 
3A Three pay
scales with set 
minima and 
maxima pay
levels with
deregulation in
between and 
retain existing 
pay band areas 
As Model 2A. Additionally 
would retain separate and 
distinct ranges for unqualified 
teachers, classroom teachers 
and the leadership group. 
The STRB would need to 
consider whether a classroom
teachers’ pay range as in this 
model should incorporate the 
potential discontinuation of the 
Advanced Skills Teachers’ and
Excellent Teachers’ 
designations as recommended
by the independent Teachers’
Standards Review Group.   
Advantages are similar to model 2. In addition…  
Retaining a separate unqualified teachers’ pay
range would help to address concern about 
model 1 that some qualified teachers may be
paid less than they are currently paid
Retaining a separate leadership group pay range 
would reinforce the difference in classroom 
teachers’ and school leaders’ roles and 
responsibilities and retains a career structure 
Having maxima for different pay scales would be 
more likely to limit overall cost inflation for 
teachers at all salary levels 
3B could help to address the concern that 
existing pay ranges may not be sufficiently
flexible in all local labour market circumstances 
Disadvantages are similar to model 2. In addition... 
Could require some additional pay flexibilities for 
governing bodies to exceed the stated maxima. Eg 
a non consolidated payment or allowance
Retaining separate pay scales could limit the 
potential to innovate and reward the best, 
regardless of role
Would need to consider transition issues if 
Threshold, AST, ET designations were removed.  If 
they were retained the associated bureaucracy of 
assessment would be retained
3B Three pay
scales with set 
Very similar to Model 2B and 
3A.
minima and 3C would avoid the issue of cliff-edges where 
maxima pay pay zones meet 
levels with
deregulation in
between and new
pay zones and 
hot spots 
3C – three pay
scales, no pay
zones
As for 3A, and 1. 
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4 Three pay
scales with
spine points
4A Three pay
scales with spine 
points between
set minima and 
maxima existing 
pay levels and 
existing pay band 
areas
Builds on 3A and would retain
the defined pay scale points 
between the minima and 
maxima of the separate 
unqualified teachers’, 
classroom teachers’ and 
leadership group pay scales. 
Head teachers would need to 
make the decision on when 
teachers should move through
the spine points.  
Advantages are similar to models 2 and 3. In 
addition…  
Would provide a degree of reassurance to some 
head teachers and governing bodies who may 
have difficulty implementing some of the more
flexible models without a statutory framework to 
operate within
The presence of a framework with defined 
reference points could potentially avoid some of 
the risks of equal pay considerations
Disadvantages are similar to models 2 and 3. In 
addition... 
Would increase the risk of some schools failing to 
innovate and would simply mirror the previous pay
arrangements which would restrict a relevant body’s 
ability to gain best value for money from the 
school’s budget
4B Three pay The same as 4A but with the 
scales with spine addition of new pay zones and
points between hot spots areas.
set minima and 
maxima existing 
pay levels and 
new pay zones 
and hotspots
5 Minimum change Builds upon 4B by largely
keeping a simplified version of 
the ‘status quo’. At a minimum, 
progression arrangements 
would still need to be reformed 
to ensure there is a more 
Advantages build on those in model 4. In 
addition…  
A relatively familiar structure could provide a 
degree of reassurance to some head teachers 
and governing bodies
Disadvantages build on those in model 4. In 
addition…
Would largely mirror previous pay arrangements 
and prevent schools from innovating
effective link between 
progression and performance.
We would still welcome the 
STRB’s views on what other 
reforms should be made to 
teachers’ pay and conditions in
order to raise the status of the 
profession and best support the 
recruitment and retention of 
high quality teachers in all 
schools. The Review Body
would still need to consider the 
second report of the 
independent Teachers’ 
Standards Review Group and 
the need for new pay zones. 
The current system of 
allowances and benefits would 
need to be reviewed to improve 
Fear of legal challenge and the prevailing
dependence upon the statutory framework could  
mean that many head teachers and governing
bodies are unlikely to utilise freedoms and 
instead need statutory support to implement 
changes  
14 

  
take up; and the STRB would 
need to make 
recommendations on other 
reforms which would raise the
status of the profession and 
support the recruitment and 
retention of high quality
teachers 
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Annex A – The Current System 
A1 	 This annex describes the current pay system for teachers and the existing links
between teachers’ pay, performance and career progression.  The scope of the 
Secretary of State’s evidence covers all pay scales, allowances and all provisions in 
the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document, other than those relating 
directly to non-pay conditions of employment.
Area pay bands
A2 	 There are currently four area pay bands that emanate from London - London inner, 
outer London, the fringe and the remainder of England and Wales.  The current pay 
bands have rigid boundaries, which at the point they were devised took account of 
areas that historically had higher teacher vacancy rates and costs of living.   
A3 	 There is no flexibility for a school, or group of schools, to ‘opt’ in or out of their 
allocated band. They do not correspond with local authority boundaries in all cases 
and some local authorities span two area pay bands.  This can create ‘cliff edges’ 
where the pay bands meet geographically, and may result in schools in the lower 
value area pay band having to offer additional payments in order to recruit 
teachers. 
A4 	 In 2003 when the current bands were recommended (in the STRB’s 13th Report Part 
One), the STRB acknowledged that there was variation within inner London in the 
extent of the problem of recruiting enough teachers and that there were similar 
difficulties in locations beyond. 
A5 	 Area pay bands may have contributed to the successful overall reduction of teacher 
shortages at a national level, but it is difficult to assess the extent to which the 
existing pay bands have actually driven this change.  Annex C describes the scope 
for pay to become more responsive to local labour markets.   
Pay scales and flexibilities
A6 	 The School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD) sets out a range of 
pay scales and allowances. Relevant bodies2 must use these, in the context of their 
pay policy and staffing structure, to determine a teacher’s salary.   
A7 	 In summary the teachers’ pay system is made up of the following:
 Unqualified teachers’ pay scale 
 Main scale for classroom teachers 
 Upper pay scale 
 Excellent Teacher pay range 
 Advanced Skills Teacher pay spine 
 Leadership group pay spine 
A8 	 Progress through the points of the main pay scale for classroom teachers is on the 
basis of a teacher completing a satisfactory year of employment.  The current Core 
Standards provide a reference point for schools that sets out what is expected of all 
teachers from the point of successful completion of statutory induction throughout 
2 ‘Relevant body’ for this purpose is either the local authority or the school’s governing body. 
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their careers. There is some evidence that some schools have used the current 
framework of professional standards in this way as part of the annual performance 
management process but there is no requirement to do so. If a teacher’s 
performance has been deemed as unsatisfactory, the relevant body still has the 
discretion to progress a teacher through the main pay scale.  The relevant body 
may also advance a teacher by two points, in total, if their performance is judged to 
be excellent. 
A9 	 Once a point is awarded to a classroom teacher on the main or upper pay scale, it is 
permanent. The only exception to this is where a teacher has been paid as an 
Excellent Teacher (ET) or Advanced Skills Teacher (AST - see below) and they 
move to a post that was not an ET or AST post. In these instances, their pay is
adjusted to reflect the change in their role and responsibilities.   
A10 	Under the current arrangements, when teachers’ performance is reviewed, those 
who are eligible for pay progression under the STPCD are entitled to a 
recommendation on pay progression. Previous guidance on performance 
management has stated that reviewers did not need to make recommendations in 
support of annual increments. 
A11 	Schools may employ ‘unqualified’ teachers who are paid on a separate pay scale. 
The progression arrangements and the awarding of points operate in a similar way 
to that of the main pay scale. The relevant body may pay an additional allowance 
for sustained additional responsibility to an unqualified teacher, the amount of which 
it decides in the context of its pay policy. 
Upper pay scale
A12 In 2000 the ‘Threshold’ was introduced as a new career structure for teachers which 
would reward effective performance. The Threshold gives teachers at the top of the 
main pay scale the option of applying to progress to the upper pay scale. Initially 
this was a five-point pay scale; in 2004 it was reduced to a three-point upper pay 
scale. Progression to the upper pay scale is dependent on a teacher being able to 
demonstrate that they have met the Post-Threshold Standards set out in the current 
Framework of Professional Standards for Teachers. These standards specify the 
attributes, knowledge and skills expected of Post-Threshold teachers. Decisions 
about whether or not these standards have been met are made by head teachers 
based on the evidence provided by the performance management process.   
A13 Currently teachers should not normally progress through the three-point upper pay 
scale more frequently than every two years. Progress through the upper pay scale 
is performance-related with the relevant body needing to satisfy itself that the 
teacher’s achievements and contribution to the school have been ‘substantial and 
sustained’. 
Excellent Teachers and Advanced Skills Teachers
A14 	Excellent Teachers use and share their skills in classroom teaching for the benefit of 
professional development of other teachers within their school.  Advanced Skills 
Teachers play a more strategic role, disseminating good practice to schools other 
than their own. 
A15 Teachers on either the main or upper pay scale may move onto the AST pay spine 
only when they have both passed a national assessment against the relevant 
standards, and taken up an AST post (not all schools have AST posts). The relevant 
body must determine a five-point range for an AST from the 18-point pay spine 
17 

  
 
 
(which is equivalent to the first 18 points of the leadership pay spine). Progress 
through the AST pay range is on the basis of up to two spine points per year – 
where there has been sustained high quality performance against identified 
performance criteria. 
A16 	Teachers who have been on the top of the upper pay scale for a minimum of two 
years may be paid as an ET if they have both passed a national assessment 
against the relevant standards and have taken up an ET post (not all schools have 
ETs – indeed there are fewer than 100 posts). The relevant body must determine a 
‘spot’ salary on the ET pay range which takes account of the nature of the work to 
be undertaken and the degree of challenge of the role.   
Head teachers, deputy heads and assistant heads
A17 	Currently head teachers’ pay is calculated with reference to the number and age of 
a school’s pupils and the number of pupils with special educational needs.  This 
enables a head teacher’s pay group from 1 to 8 to be determined and within which 
governors have discretion to identify a seven-point pay range for the head teacher 
from the 43-point leadership pay spine.  The STRB’s 20th Report resulted in a 25 
per cent limit being introduced to any discretionary payments made to head 
teachers in the 2011 STPCD. The 25 per cent limit is based on a head teacher’s 
current point on their individual school range.
A18 Deputy and assistant head teachers’ salaries must consist of five consecutive spine 
points on the leadership group pay spine. There must be differentiation between a 
deputy head’s, assistant head’s and the highest paid classroom teacher’s salaries.  
A19 	Currently progression through an individual’s pay range is dependent on ‘sustained 
high quality performance’ against identified objectives.  For exceptional performance 
governors may award a two point increase.   
Other pay and provisions 
A20 	The STPCD contains a number of additional payments, benefits, allowances and 
incentives which the relevant body may use to reward teachers and members of the 
leadership group. There is no provision within the STPCD for the payment of 
bonuses or honoraria to teachers.  The main payments and flexibilities are set out 
below. 
A21 	Teaching and Learning Responsibility (TLR) payments – the relevant body may 
award a TLR to a classroom teacher who occupies a post in which they have 
‘sustained additional responsibility’ for ‘ensuring the continued delivery of high-
quality teaching and learning’. There are two TLR ranges – TLR1 (£7,323 to 
£12,393) and (TLR2 £2,535 to £6,197) with criteria being attached to the awarding 
of a TLR payment. There has been some interest from other consultees in 
reviewing TLRs – with the aim, for example, of making them temporary or fixed 
term. 
A22 Special Educational Needs (SEN) allowance – teachers of pupils with special 
needs may receive an allowance of between £2,001 and £3,954 per annum subject 
to meeting the criteria set out in the STPCD.  The relevant body must determine the 
spot value of the allowance, taking into account the structure of the school’s SEN 
provision and other factors. 
A23 	Recruitment and retention incentives and benefits – the relevant body can make 
extra payments or offer other benefits to teachers for recruitment and retention 
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purposes and can decide the amounts themselves (with the exception of payments 
to head teachers, which must be within the 25 per cent limit on discretionary 
payments and which may only be exceeded in ‘wholly exceptional circumstances’).  
These may be awarded for a fixed period not exceeding three years.  In exceptional 
cases awards for retention purposes may be renewed.
A24 	Flexibility over the starting salary of Newly Qualified Teachers (NQTs) - In
addition to the pay allowances available to existing teachers, there is flexibility to 
start NQTs above the bottom rung of the pay scale. 
A25 	Chartered London Teachers (CLT) – the CLT status was launched in September 
2004 to help improve the quality, recruitment and retention of the teaching 
workforce in London schools.  To qualify for the CLT status a teacher must have 
worked in London state schools for at least four years, be above the main pay scale, 
have evidence to demonstrate all of the CLT standards and have been registered 
on the CLT programme for at least two years. The programme rewards teachers 
who have remained in London and completed the CLT standards with a Master’s 
credit and a one-off payment of £1,000.  
A26 	Other additional payments – the relevant body may make additional payments as 
they see fit to classroom teachers for: professional development undertaken outside 
the school day; activities relating to the provision of initial teacher training; and 
participation in out-of-school hours activity.   
A27 	Other discretionary payments to head teachers – the relevant body may also 
make a payment to a head teacher where: the school is causing concern; it is 
considered that without such payment the school would have either substantial 
difficulty filling the vacant head teacher post or substantial difficulty retaining the 
existing head teacher; or the head teacher is appointed as a temporary head of one 
or more additional schools. In addition, head teachers may also be awarded a 
payment for raising educational standards in one or more additional schools (these 
payments would fall within the 25 per cent limit as described above). 
A28 	Residential allowance – the relevant body may pay an allowance for residential 
duties, the amount of which it decides, in the context of its pay policy. 
A29 	Acting allowance – the relevant body may pay an allowance to a teacher for 
assuming the duties of a head teacher, deputy or assistant head teacher, the 
amount of which it decides, in the context of its pay policy. 
A30 	Performance payment – the relevant body may award a lump sum to a teacher if 
they are seconded to a post as a head teacher in a school which is causing 
concern. 
Safeguarded payments
A31 	The STPCD contains a number of complex provisions related to safeguarding 
teachers’ salaries for up to three years if, as a result of changes to the school’s 
staffing structure or pay policy, a teacher (or a member of the leadership group) is to 
receive a reduction in salary. So for example if a school decides to remove a post 
which attracts a TLR payment, then the school must compare the post holder’s 
salary entitlement on the day before the change occurs, with the new entitlement 
after the change, and for the difference to be paid as a safeguarded sum.  If the 
safeguarded sum totals more than £500, the school must review the teacher’s 
assigned duties and allocate such additional duties as they consider appropriate 
during the time that it is in payment.   
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A32 	The STPCD also contains separate safeguarding provisions which relate to 
teachers who have lost their post due to the closure or reorganisation of an 
educational establishment or school on or before 31 December 2005, and on or 
after 1 January 2006. 
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Annex B: Application of the current system
B1 This section presents analysis of how the current pay system is applied. It 
includes analysis of how teachers progress through the pay scales and shows that 
there is little to suggest that a link exists between pay progression and school 
performance. It goes on to describe the extent to which existing pay flexibilities 
are utilised by different types of school, including academies. 
Analysis of pay by school sector
B2 DfE’s analysis of the 2010 School Workforce Census shows that the overall level 
of pay varies between school sectors. As illustrated in figure 1B, teachers in 
academies tend to be younger than in maintained schools, and age can broadly 
be related to teaching experience, which impacts upon pay. The distribution of 
teaching experience is reflected in figure 2B which shows sponsor-led academies, 
on average, pay less3 to classroom teachers than all secondary schools across 
the pay areas. Converter academies have lower mean classroom teacher salaries 
than all secondary schools4 in Inner and Outer London, but similar pay outside of 
London.
Figure 1B 
3 Generally, salaries diverging by more than £300 have been considered to be ‘more’/’less ’. 

4 The ‘All Secondary Schools’ category includes teachers in academies from whom a spine point from the STPCD was reported via 

the workforce census; this covers around 75per cent of teac hers in academies.
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Figure 2B
B3 Figure 3B sh ows that converter academies paid higher leadership salaries than 
the ‘all secondary schools’ group outside o  London and paid similar salaries in the 
Outer London pay area. Sponsor-led academies paid less than all secondary 
schools in Inner and Outer London, but more in the Rest of England pay area. 
There were insufficient data points for London Fringe sponsor-led academies and 
Inner London converter academies. 
Figure 3B
B4 DfE analysis of the 2010 School Workforce Census5 provides a distribution of all 
classroom teachers in the maintained sector across current pay spines. Figure 4B 
below suggests that just under 50 per cent of those teaching in primary schools 
are on the upper pay scale with some slight variation across school type. 
5 DfE Analysis of 2010 School Workforce Census. Includes all teachers, in cluding those working part time.
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Figure 4B
B5 Figure 5B su ggests the proportion was higher for secondary schools with over 50 
per cent of teachers at this stage on the upper pay scale. This varied across 
school type to a greater extent than in primary schools. 
Figure 5B
B6 The distribution across pay spines mimics the age distribution of classroom
teachers shown in Figure 6B, although the age data is from 2008-09. 
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Figure 6B 
The Proportions of Classroom Teachers by Age for each Pay
Band 
0% 
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Scope: England & Wales 2009 
B7 	 The DfE School Workforce Census doesn’t currently enable monitoring of 
progress across pay spines.6  However a survey conducted by ORC International 
on behalf of the Office of Manpower Economics (OME) in 2008/09 sampled 
schools across local authorities in England and Wales (Byrne et al, 2009)7 and 
investigated the extent to which progression was being utilised.  This research 
appears to suggest a similar distribution of qualified classroom teachers across 
the pay scales as obtained from DfE 2010 analysis.  It supplements DfE evidence 
highlighting that there are variations in the distribution for full and part-time 
teachers; with a higher proportion (66 per cent) of part-time qualified teachers 
being on the upper pay scale than full-time qualified teachers (52 per cent).   
B8 	 Looking specifically at full-time qualified teachers and their progression up the pay 
scales the ORC research suggests that 49 per cent of qualified classroom 
teachers were on a higher spine point in 2008/09 than in the previous year.  In 
primary schools 53 per cent of classroom teachers progressed by at least one 
spine point and in secondary schools 47 per cent progressed. 
B9 	 Figure 7B compares progression of primary and secondary phase classroom 
teachers. This suggests that for full-time primary school classroom teachers: 
 virtually all teachers on the main pay scale (M1 to M5) progressed to the 
next point 
 45 per cent of those on M6 progressed to U1 
 38 per cent of those on U1 progressed to U2 
 32 per cent of those on U2 progressed to U3 
B10 	 Primary and secondary teachers showed a similar pattern of progression up the 
main scale, but a smaller proportion of teachers progressed on to the upper pay 
scale in primary than in the secondary phase.   
6 DfE plan to investigate the feasibility of linking future School Workforce Census returns to enable longitudinal Analysis going
forward.
7 3000 schools across all 172 local authorities were sampled based on phase and school size.  A total of 1090 (36 per cent) of 
schools and 74 (43 per cent) of local authorities completed the questionnaire
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Figure 7B
B11 The analysis detailed in Figure 8B also shows some variation according to working 
pattern. Whi lst the pattern for full-time and part-time teachers progressing on the 
main pay scale between 2007/08 and 2008/09 was similar, within the upper pay 
scale the proportion of part-time t eachers progressing was lower than full-time. 
Approximately 15 per cent of part time teachers progressed from M6 to U1
compared with 45 per cent of full time teachers. 
Figure 8B
Figure 9B
B12 Figure 9B provides information about the proportions of eligible teachers applying 
to access the upper pay scale and their success rates. The figure illustrates that 
the proportion of eligible teachers applying to access the upper pay scale was 
lower in primary than in secondary phase (47 per cent and 60 per cent 
respectively). For those that did apply, the success rate was over 90 per cent (92 
per cent primary and 96 per cent secondary). 
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B13 Overall applications for progression to the upper pay scale appear to have
reduced over the years. The ORC report also confirms that a lower proportion of 
qualified teachers progressed from the main pay scale to upper pay scale in 
2008/09 than the two years previously. 
B14 Reporting on a study of the introduction of performance related pay, Wragg et al in 
2003/4 noted that the success rate was 86 per cent of all teachers eligible to apply 
for the upper pay scale and 97 per cent of those who actually applied. This 
suggests that success rates have remained fairly constant over time. 
Pay scale progression and performance
B15 DfE publishe d analysis (DFE-RR 151) covering the distribution of teachers across 
pay scales against outcomes achieved, as measured by Key Stage results, shows 
no clear link between the distribution of teachers across the pay-scales nationally 
and the performance of the schools in which they work. 
Figure 10B8 
B16 However, the national picture hides variation across regions. Recent DfE analysis 
of mean salaries by area in England revealed that classroom teachers we re 
typically paid more in below-floor schools in Inner London than i n mid-performing 
or high-performing schools in the same area. However, classroom teachers in 
below-floor schools outside of Inner London were paid less on average than those 
in other KS2 schools. 
Schools are defined as being below the floor at KS2 if less than 60 per cent of pupils are achieving level 4 or above in English and mathematics 
combined, they are below the England median for progression by two levels in English, and they are below the England median for progression by
two levels in mathematics.
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Figure 11B
B17 In secondary schools the differences were more distinct, with approximately 50
per cent of teachers below the Key Stage 4 (KS4) floor targets on the upper pay 
scale compared to 60 per cent with the highest KS4 results. 
2B 9Figure 1  
B18	 Again this national picture masked variation across regions. Classroom teachers 
in below-floor schools were paid less on average than those in other schools in 
Inner and Outer London. However, similarly to those in mid-performing schools in 
the London Fringe and Rest of England pay areas, those in high-performing 
schools were paid more than those in mid-performing schools in the London 
Fringe and Rest of England. 
9 Schools are defined as being below the floor at KS4 if less than 35 per cent of pupils at the end of Key Stage 4 (KS4) a re 
achieving five or more GCSEs A*-C (or equivalents) including English and mathematics GCSE, and they have below ave rage percent 
of pupils at the end of KS4 making expected progress in English, and they have below average percent of pupils at the end of KS4 
making expected progress in mathematics.
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Figure 13B
B19 There is a range of factors that this analysis does not take into account which 
could be driv ing the outcomes achieved in terms of pupil performance or value 
added scores. The research evidence (Alexander, 2010) suggests that this 
complex and interrelated range of factors includes: teachers’ level of experience, 
deep subject knowledge and degree of autonomy in the classroom; and pupil 
characteristics such as parental education level, family socio-economic status,
gender, ethnicity and special educational needs. According to the OECD (2005a), 
‘Student learning is influenced by many factors, including: students’ skills, 
expectations, motivation and behaviour; family resources, attitudes and support; 
peer group skills, attitudes and behaviour; school organisation, resources and 
climate; curriculum structure and content; and teacher skills, knowledge, attitudes 
and practices.’ 
B20 So for example, in practice – given that progression in the current system is very 
much linked to teacher length of experience and age – it is possible that it is the 
increased experience of those in the upper pay band, rather than pay, which is 
responsible or higher performance at Key Stage 4. DfE’s published analysis 
(DFE-RR-151) indicate d that those high-performing schools at KS4 and those with 
‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ behaviour both had slightly older than typical teacher age 
profiles. Figure 14B shows that high-performing Key Stage 4 schools had a larger 
proportion of teachers aged 40 or above; mid-performing and below-floor schools 
had similar teacher age distributions. However, there were no noteworthy 
differences in the teacher age profile according to Key Stage 2 performance. 
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Figure 14B
Use of pay flexibilities
B21	 Analysis of the School Workforce Census (November 2010)10 suggests 62 per 
cent of maintained schools in England made use of at least one of the following 
four pay flexibilities11: recruitment and retention payments, TLR payments, SEN 
payments and placing NQTs above pay spine point M1 (see Table 1B). 
Secondary schools were most likely to make use of pay flexibilities, and nursery 
and primary schools were least likely (85 per cent compared to 57 per cent).   
B22	 Table 1B shows that in 2010: 
 9 per cent of maintained schools used recruitment and retention payments 
(RR). 
 58 per cent used TLR payments. 
 10 per cent used SEN payments. 
 3 per cent placed NQTs above pay spine point M1. 
B23 There has been a steep decline in registrations to Chartered London Teacher
status since the scheme was launched in 2004. A total of 37,000 teachers
registered over the first eighteen months up to March 2006. Currently the numbers 
are significantly lower, with just 422 teachers completing the programme to meet 
the CLT standards within this financial year. 
B24 The Office for Manpower Economics commissioned research on the use of formal 
and informal flexibilities (OME 2011). Their report is based on survey responses 
from 610 head teachers and 181 chairs of governors from a rep resentative mix (of 
791 schools)12 across school size, phase and region of England and Wales13. The 
fieldwork was conducted in Autumn 2010. 
B25 Overall, this research found 81 per cent of schools surveyed used TLR payments, 
40 per cent used SEN allowances and 22 per cent used RR payments, with 12 per 
cent of surve yed schools using none of these. These percentages are 
10 Using an updated dataset to that available at the time of the School Workforce Census publication. The publication can be 
accessed at: http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SF R/s000997/index.shtml
11 A school is counted if they are paying a pa y flexibility to at least one full-time qualified classroom teacher.
12 Stratified single-stage sampling design by region, type of school and school size. Sample allocation to the strata was d isproportional 
to compensate for anticipated differential response rates in some strata and to achieve minimum sample sizes for groups of schools 
within domains of interest.
13 To mitigate the risk of non-response bias within achieved sample, weights were applied to the survey records.
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considerably higher than those resulting from the School Workforce Census 
analysis.  Importantly, the OME sample was drawn to be representative of the 
school population and the questionnaire asked head teachers to focus on use of 
current flexibilities for staff, which will include part-time staff and unqualified 
teachers. The Census analysis, however, only considers pay flexibilities awarded 
to full-time qualified teachers. Taken together, these sources indicate the 
significant use of pay flexibilities for a number of part-time and unqualified 
teachers. 
B26 	 The OME’s research survey also explored the attitudes of head teachers to the 
pay flexibilities that are currently available to them: 
 56 per cent of head teachers said they were very familiar with the 
allowances, but fewer than one in five (17 per cent) chairs of governors 
were. 
 52 per cent of head teachers did not believe that existing allowances 
sufficiently cater for the need to reward high performance.  
 Many head teachers did not believe that Teaching and Learning 
Responsibilities (TLR), Special Educational Needs (SEN) and Recruitment 
and Retention (RR) allowances are sufficiently flexible (37 per cent, 24 per 
cent and 25 per cent respectively). 
B27 	 The survey prompted those who were not satisfied with the current reward system 
for their views on alternative flexibilities: 
 71 per cent head teachers agreed with proposals for enabling time-limited 
payments. 
 67 per cent supported enabling greater flexibility in the size of the reward. 
 62 per cent wanted the provision to share payments between teachers. 
Use of pay flexibility by school type
B28 	 The analysis of the School Workforce Census showed that use of flexibilities 
varied by phase and type of payment. Maintained secondary schools made the 
most use of both recruitment and retention allowances and TLR payments, with 37 
per cent of schools in this phase reported at least one full-time qualified classroom 
teacher receiving an RR payment and 79 per cent using TLR payments. Special 
schools led the way on SEN payments with 69 per cent of maintained special 
schools reporting use of the SEN payment.  Finally, 13 per cent of secondary 
schools chose to place at least 1 NQT above pay spine point M1 compared to only 
2 per cent of nursery and primary schools.   
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Table 1B: Pay flexibilities by school phase
Phase of school Total numberof schools 
Number 
As % of
schools in
phase 
Schools using RR 
payments 
Number 
As % of
schools in 
phase 
Schools using TLR
payments 
Number 
As % of
schools in 
phase 
Schools using SEN
payments 
Number 
As % of
schools in
phase 
Schools placing NQTs
above M1 
Number 
As % of
schools in 
phase 
Schools using any of 
the pay flexibilities 
Nursery and Primary 17,207 772 4.5% 9,211 53.5% 1,142 6.6% 295 1.7% 9,770 56.8% 
Secondary 2,935 1,089 37.1% 2,312 78.8% 389 13.3% 396 13.5% 2,502 85.2% 
Special 955 72 7.5% 621 65.0% 657 68.8% 13 1.4% 775 81.2% 
Total 21,097 1,933 9.2% 12,144 57.6% 2,188 10.4% 704 3.3% 13,047 61.8% 
Source: School Workforce Census, November 2010 
Coverage: Maintained schools with at least one full-time qualified classroom teacher receiving pay flexibilities, by type 
B29 	 The OME survey also explored how use of flexibility varied by school type, as 
shown in Figure 15B below. This supports general findings from the School 
Workforce Census and shows: 
 Small primary schools made the least use of allowances: 26 per cent of 
them used none of the allowances. 
 RR payments were most likely to be used in secondary schools (63 per 
cent of the small secondary schools surveyed and 42 per cent of the large 
secondary schools reviewed). 
 TLR payments were used in the vast majority of schools, with a slightly 
lower percentage in special schools (89 per cent).  
Figure 15B: Allowances used by type of school14 
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Recruitment and retention (RR) payments
B30 	 Building on the data presented in Table 1B, Departmental analysis of 2010 School 
Workforce Census data showed maintained secondary schools in England paid 
more in RR payments than secondary academies, except for qualified classroom 
teachers15. However, the analysis on academies here should be treated with some 
caution and will only offer an indication; this is because (i) there were only 350 
academies at the time of the 2010 School Workforce Census, compared to over 
All heads; Specials (148), small secondary (101), small primary (141), large secondary (92), large primary (128). Multicode. 
Weighted data Source OME (2011) Teachers’ pay survey, accessed at
15 The geography of academies has not been controlled for in this case due to small numbers. Similarly, primary and all-through 
academies and centrally employed staff are not shown. In addition, the leadership group have been combined. However, the numbers 
are still small; there are 21 cases of leadership group teachers in secondary academies and CTCs who receive RR payments. 
Statistics based on RR payments to the leadership group in secondary academies should therefore be treated with caution.
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1,750 now and (ii) for those academies with a predecessor school, it is likely many 
of their staff transferred on existing terms and conditions. 
B31 	 Of those who received RR payments, unqualified teachers in maintained 
secondary schools received the most; this can be seen from Figures 16B and 17B 
below16. This also supports the survey finding from the OME (2011) survey, which 
showed RR allowances were most likely to be used in secondary schools. 
B32 	 Figure 16B shows maintained secondary schools award a higher proportion of 
staff RR payments than secondary academies and City Technology Colleges 
(CTCs). This is true for all grades. The difference is greater for unqualified 
teachers and it is this group that receives the highest proportion of RR payments.  
This is the case for all school types with the exception of maintained nursery and 
primary schools.
Figure 16B: Proportion of full-time teachers who receive recruitment and retention 
payments by post and phase/sector
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B33 	 Figure 17B shows the average annual RR payments by post and phase/sector. 
This shows maintained secondary schools and secondary academies pay similar 
amounts in RR, but maintained secondary schools pay slightly more (an additional 
£450) to unqualified teachers and the leadership group (£550).  
16 Region was not controlled for in this analysis.
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Figure 17B: Average annual recruitment and retention payments to full-time 
teachers who receive them by post and phase/sector
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Source: School Workforce Census, November 2010 
Coverage: Full-time leadership and classsroom teachers 
Teaching and learning responsibility (TLR) payments
B34 	 Departmental analysis of 2010 School Workforce Census data showed there are a 
greater number of posts attracting a TLR payment17 in maintained secondary 
schools compared to secondary academies 18. As can be seen from Figure 18B 
below, 42 per cent of qualified teachers in maintained secondary schools received 
a TLR payment as opposed to 35 per cent of qualified teachers in secondary 
academies and CTCs. Maintained nursery and primary schools make the least 
use of TLR payments to their qualified classroom teachers. 
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17 For TLRs, it is important to note it is the post rather than the teacher that attracts the payment. This analysis is based on the TLR 

posts held by full-time qualified teachers only.

18 Region was not controlled for in this analysis.
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Figure 18B: Proportion of full-time teachers who receive who receive TLR 
payments by phase/sector
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Figure 19B: Average annual TLR payments to full-time teachers who receive them 
by phase/sector
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B35 	 Figure 19B shows the average annual TLR payments by phase/sector. This shows 
maintained secondary schools and secondary academies pay similar amounts in 
TLR to qualified teachers (both around £5,500).  
SEN payments
B36 	 School Workforce Census analysis shows SEN payments are primarily used in 
special schools. In maintained special schools 63 per cent of qualified classroom 
teachers receive an SEN payment, with an average value of £2,600 for those in 
receipt of them. Just 1 per cent of qualified classroom teachers in maintained 
nursery and primary schools, 0.5 per cent in maintained secondary schools and 
0.3 per cent in secondary academies and CTCs receive the payments.  These 
have an average value of around £2,400 in maintained nursery and primary 
schools, £2,300 in maintained secondary schools and £2,500 in secondary 
academies and CTCs (although again this is based on less than 50 teachers 
receiving the payment). 
Use of pay flexibility in academies
B37 	 Academies have greater freedom over how they use their budgets, have the ability 
to set their own pay and conditions for staff and do not have to comply with the 
STPCD. In March 2012 the Schools Network and Reform published the results of 
a survey of 478 Academies – around 1/3 of the total number at the time.  73 per 
cent of those surveyed said that financial autonomy was one of the reasons that 
they chose to become an Academy, with 22 per cent specifically citing flexibility 
over pay and conditions as influencing their decision. 
B38 	 When asked whether they had used the freedoms over terms and conditions, 
including but not limited to pay, 25 per cent said that they either had or planned to 
do so. Those that had used these freedoms had done so in various ways, 
including:
 Creating new posts and responsibilities which fall outside of existing 
frameworks. 
 Introducing performance related pay to attract the best staff. 
 Altering pay scales across the board for teachers and support staff to help 
with staff retention. 
B39 	 There were a large proportion of Academies (65 per cent) that had no plans to use 
these flexibilities.  Of all academies surveyed:  
 60 per cent said that the existence of national pay and conditions makes it 
difficult for them to vary pay and conditions in their school. 
 30 per cent said that TUPE regulations prevented them from making 
changes.
 20 per cent said union opposition makes it difficult to vary pay and 
conditions. 
B40 	 There are a number of notable cases of the use of pay flexibilities in Academies. 
Harris Federation has used its flexibilities to make it easier to transfer staff to 
support neighbouring schools and to allow them to appoint outstanding staff to 
work across more than one school. They use a range of financial incentives and 
bonuses for good performance, including for attendance and examination 
performance. The ARK Schools’ contract allows them to offer teachers an 
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additional 2.5 per cent above the schools teachers’ pay and conditions in order to 
give them the flexibility to deploy teachers flexibly within certain hours, whilst the 
Capital City Academy rewards its staff financially for running extra-curricular 
classes. 
Use of pay flexibility by region
B41 	 The OME survey found head teachers in London were significantly more likely 
than those from other regions to use TLRs (95 per cent compared with 81 per cent 
nationally). Head teachers in London were also more likely to use RR incentives 
than those in other regions (33 per cent compared to 22 per cent). There was little 
difference in the use of SEN allowances across regions.  
B42 	 Internal DfE analysis from 2010 School Workforce Census data found that London 
schools made the greatest use of pay flexibilities – with 78 per cent of Outer 
London and 71 per cent of Inner London schools using at least one type of pay 
flexibility in 2010. Conversely, less than half (47 per cent) of maintained schools 
in the South West made use of pay flexibilities, much lower than the average of 62 
per cent. Inner and Outer London schools exceeded the other regions for use of 
all four types of pay flexibility.  South West schools were least likely to make use 
of RR and TLR payments, while West Midlands were least likely to use SEN 
payments and the North West were least likely to place NQTs above M1.  Table 
2B below shows the percentage of maintained schools (not including academies) 
in each region making use of each type of pay flexibility.
Table 2B: Pay flexibilities by region
Region of school 
Total number
of maintained 
schools in As % of 
Schools using RR
payments 
As % of 
Schools using TLR
payments 
As % of 
Schools using SEN 
payments 
As % of 
Schools placing NQTs
above M1 
As % of 
Schools using any of 
the pay flexibilities 
region schools in schools in schools in schools in schools in 
Number region Number region Number region Number region Number phase 
North East 1,153 93 8.1% 693 60.1% 109 9.5% 25 2.2% 720 62.4% 
South West 2,257 80 3.5% 946 41.9% 235 10.4% 56 2.5% 1,062 47.1% 
North West 3,056 155 5.1% 1,792 58.6% 340 11.1% 35 1.1% 1,878 61.5% 
Yorkshire and The Humber 2,209 191 8.6% 1,235 55.9% 158 7.2% 52 2.4% 1,334 60.4% 
East Midlands 2,007 165 8.2% 1,267 63.1% 231 11.5% 37 1.8% 1,346 67.1% 
West Midlands 2,302 266 11.6% 1,460 63.4% 144 6.3% 78 3.4% 1,530 66.5% 
East of England 2,514 276 11.0% 1,224 48.7% 264 10.5% 82 3.3% 1,399 55.6% 
Inner London 905 200 22.1% 621 68.6% 140 15.5% 67 7.4% 646 71.4% 
Outer London 1,432 170 11.9% 1,075 75.1% 189 13.2% 135 9.4% 1,119 78.1% 
South East 3,262 337 10.3% 1,831 56.1% 378 11.6% 137 4.2% 2,013 61.7% 
Total 21,097 1,933 9.2% 12,144 57.6% 2,188 10.4% 704 3.3% 13,047 61.8% 
Source: School Workforce Census, November 2010 
Coverage: Maintained schools with at least one full-time qualified classroom teacher receiving pay flexibilities, by type and region 
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Annex C: The teacher labour market
C1 	 This annex presents analysis of the teacher labour market and the significant 
variety that exists within it. Using vacancy rates as a measure of supply and 
demand it highlights the variety that exists between regions, between local 
authorities and between schools within local authorities.  It also highlights 
significantly different levels of vacancies across different subjects. 
National trends in interest in teaching careers
C2 	 The proportion of trainees undertaking Initial Teacher Training (ITT) who are good 
graduates (holding a 2:1 or above) is improving (TDA Performance Profiles, 
2001/02 – 2009/10). The latest figures for course registrations to ITT forecast that 
overall targets for Primary and Secondary in 2011/12 will be met, with recruitment 
for five subjects forecasted to be below targets (ITT Trainee Numbers Census).  
C3 	 The DfE estimates the future demand for teachers taking into consideration a 
variety of factors, including the projected number of pupils in schools, the number 
of teachers required to implement policy initiatives and the assumed class sizes 
(Pupil Teacher Ratios).  It also takes into account other factors such as the 
number of teachers leaving the profession (wastage) and retiring, as well as those 
expected to return to teaching in the state-funded sector.  Whilst the Department 
aims to estimate future teacher demand, it is the decisions taken at school level,
including about recruitment, which determine the actual number of teachers 
required. 
C4 	 In order to meet the estimated level of demand as closely as possible the 
Department sets targets for recruitment to ITT courses, which since April 2012 has 
been the responsibility of the Teaching Agency. Teacher trainee places are then 
allocated to training providers on a national basis with regard given to the 
provider’s record on student recruitment, trainee employment and Ofsted 
inspection results of provider quality. 
C5 	 Of all 44,300 entrants to teaching in publicly-funded schools in England in 2009­
10; 51 per cent were newly qualified entrants; 29 per cent were new to the 
publicly-funded sector (qualified before 2009); and 20 per cent were returners to 
the publicly-funded sector (having previously taught in the publicly funded sector).  
In the same year, there were 39,900 leavers from teaching, of which 72 per cent 
moved out of the publicly funded sector and 28 per cent retired.
Variations in the teacher labour market
C6 	 Within the national teacher labour market there are a number of overlapping 
teacher labour markets. These overlapping teacher labour markets vary locally as 
well as between different groups in the teaching workforce (such as primary and 
secondary teachers). 
C7 	 These multiple variations mean that pay, which is currently set using a national 
framework, is unlikely to reflect the local conditions of the teacher labour market. 
This can potentially lead to a teacher shortage in some areas and an over-supply 
of teachers in others. Teacher shortages or over-supply can be indicated by data 
on vacancy rates, turnover rates and unemployment rates for teachers relative to 
other graduates. 
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Variation in vacancy rates19 across pay bands
C8 	 The analysis of vacancy rates across existing pay bands, as presented in Figure 
1C, shows a marked geographical pattern. The median vacancy rate decreases 
with distance from Inner London. Vacancy rates in Inner London and Outer 
London are highly variable when compared to the rest of the country. There are 
also variations within the remaining pay band areas; a small number of authorities 
covered by the Rest of England and Wales pay bands show higher vacancy rates 
than some local authorities covered within the Fringe, Outer London or Inner 
London pay bands. The 2009 data is consistent with this, with the exception that 
vacancy rates and the gap between Inner London and other pay band areas had 
reduced. 
Figure 1C20: 2005-07
Box Plot to show LA Vacancy Rates by Pay Band 
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Scope: England & Wales 2005-07 
19 Data are from 618G survey. Footnote 2 to paragraph D2 of annex D clarifies the reasoning for the time period used in the analysis.
20 In each pay band, 90 per cent of the LAs lie within the range of the vertical bars.  50 per cent of the LAs lie within the range of the
box. The median is the horizontal line within the box.
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Figure 2C: 2009
Box Plot to show LA Vacancy Rates by Pay Band 
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Regional variations in vacancy rates
Table 1C: Vacancies in England by government office region21 
Vacancy rate (percentage of posts vacant) 
GOR Jan 2001 Jan 2002 Jan 2003 Jan 2004 Jan 2005 Jan 2006 Jan 2007 Jan 2008 Jan 2009 Jan 2010 
North East  0.8  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.5  
North West  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 
East Midlands 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 
West Midlands 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.6 
East of England 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.5 
London 3.5 2.7 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.6 
South East  2.0  1.4  1.2  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.8  0.6  0.4  
South West  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.2  
England 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 
England (excl. London) 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 
Source: 618g Survey and School Workforce Census 
C9 	 The vacancy rate provides one indicator of teacher shortages. Table 1C shows 
vacancy rates by English region between 2001 and 2010 and highlights regional 
variation. Despite being in almost constant decline, vacancy rates in London have 
been at least 40 per cent higher than the national average across the entire time 
series, although this masks variations within local authorities which are set out 
below. In the East of England, vacancy rates have been a minimum of 15 per cent 
higher across the time series. With a few exceptions, vacancy rates in the South 
East have also been higher than the national average, as have rates for the last 
three years in the West Midlands. 
21 Based on advertised vacancies for full-time permanent appointments (or appointments of at least one term's duration). Includes 
vacancies being filled on a temporary basis of less than one term.  Data collected through the 618g Survey and the School Workforce 
Census 2010.
39 

  
                 
 
                  
 
              
 
 
 
 
C10	 As London has had persistently higher than average vacancy rates, a notional 
national average excluding London has been used to examine whether any of the 
regions have persistently low vac ancy rates, perhaps indicating an over-supply of 
teachers in that region. For each year between 2001 and 2010 vacancy rates in 
the South West have been at least 30 per cent lower than this notional average 
(excluding London); for the North West, rates have been at least 14 per cent 
lower, and for the East Midlands at least 11 per cent lower. 
Unemployment rates amongst teachers
Figure 3C: Graduate and teacher unemployment rates22 
C11 	 Regional variations in the unemployment rate amongst teachers can be used as 
an indicator of regional variations in over and under supply of teachers. Figure 3C 
shows the unemployment rates o f degree holders across regions against the rate 
for those with teaching qualifications. The fact that the gap between the 
unemployment rate for teachers and other degree holders varies markedly across 
regions suggests that there is an undersupply of teachers in some areas – for 
example, in London – and a possible over-supply in others, such as Tyne and 
Wear. 
The mobility of the teaching workforce
C12 The Teaching Agency Performance Profiles and Employment Dataset provide 
information on where ITT trainees originate from, where they train, and where they 
eventually find employment. Analysis of this data suggests the majority of ITT 
trainees choose to train and then later work in what they define as their “home 
region”. For those completing ITT in 2009/10, 75 per cent completed their training 
22 Due to small sample sizes these figures should be considered as indicative rather than definitive. Where low unemployment rates 
amongst teachers have been rounded they may appear to b e zero.
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in their home region and within a year 80 per cent of those who were employed in 
teaching found work in their home region.    
C13 	 The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA 2011) compared the domicile 
region of graduates at time of entry to Higher Education (HE) with their region of 
employment approximately three and a half years after leaving HE. With the 
exception of London, the proportion of graduates finding employment in their 
domicile region was lower than the 80 per cent found for teachers. The higher 
proportion observed for teachers might reflect that the ability to work close to 
home is a motivating factor for graduates choosing the teaching profession, or 
may reflect the fact that while the availability of teaching positions is largely driven 
by population density, other graduate careers may be centred in particular regions 
and require greater mobility. 
C14 	 Given that most trainees choose to train in their home region, it is important to be 
aware of the proportion of trainees that originate from each region. TA 
Performance Profiles data from 2009/10 show that the region contributing the 
greatest number of trainees is London (19 per cent), followed by the South East 
(16 per cent) and the North West (12 per cent). The most common regions for 
trainees to have completed ITT provision are the same (19 per cent London, 16 
per cent South East, 16 per cent North West). The region contributing the least 
number of trainees and provision is the North East, with 4 per cent of all trainees 
stating this region as their home. However, this distribution aligns quite closely
with the distribution of teachers across the country.  
Variations in turnover rates
C15 	 Table 2C shows turnover rates by English region between 2003/04 and 2008/09.  
Historically, and in line with vacancy rates, the East of England, London and South 
East have had above average turnover rates. Of all the regions, the North East 
has consistently had the lowest turnover rates over the period, although 
differences between regions have narrowed in the most recent years of data. 
Table 2C: Teacher turnover23 rates24 
Coverage: England 
Turnover rate 
GOR 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-093 
North East 14.5 13.2 15.2 15.3 15.7 16.5 
North West 18.2 16.6 17.2 17.0 17.1 18.2 
Yorkshire and the Humber 16.5 16.9 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.4 
East Midlands 18.4 17.9 18.4 17.3 17.5 19.0 
West Midlands 16.7 16.2 17.0 17.4 17.6 18.2 
East of England 19.5 19.1 20.1 19.5 19.7 20.7 
London 21.4 19.9 19.5 18.0 18.2 19.0 
South East 19.1 19.6 19.4 17.9 18.1 19.3 
South West 17.9 17.9 18.2 16.6 16.8 18.5 
England 	  18.3  17.8  18.2  17.5  18.6  
Source: Database of Teacher Records 
23 Full-time turnover is defined as all teachers in full-time service in the English maintained school sector on 31 March 2008 who were 
not in full-time service in the same establishment on 31 March 2009. Turnover therefore includes wastage, transfer to other 
establishments within the maintained school sector and teachers leaving to part-time service. Not all employers record all movements 
between schools within their area so rates are understated.
24 Source: Database of Teacher Records.  2008-09 shows provisional estimates.  Academies included from 2007/08 onwards
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C16 	 For both vacancy and turnover rates, differences between regions have narrowed 
in recent years. The East of England, London and South East have all shown 
above average vacancy and turnover rates historically. The lowest vacancy rates 
were seen in the South West, while turnover rates were nearer to average in the 
South West. The North East has the lowest turnover rates over the period and 
generally shows below average vacancy rates. 
Vacancies at leadership level
C17 	 About one in four head teachers are set to retire in the next few years with 
particular pressures on head teacher recruitment in the primary sector.  The 17th 
annual report for the NAHT (NAHT 2011) examined 1,230 posts on the Leadership 
Scale advertised by publicly-funded schools and academies in England and Wales 
in 2010/11. Despite increases in the average number of applications per vacancy 
on the previous year, 36 per cent of primary, 19 per cent of secondary and 39 per 
cent of special school head teacher posts were reported unfilled after an 
advertisement. Equivalent figures for deputy head posts and assistant head posts 
also indicate some difficulty in recruiting at leadership grades. 
C18 	 Of primary schools advertising a headship post, schools in the South East 
reported receiving fewest applications, with 53 per cent receiving three or fewer 
completed forms. In addition, 43 per cent of primary schools in the South East 
reported being unable to make an appointment, with comparable figures in 
Eastern England (41 per cent) and London (40 per cent). For secondary headship 
posts, however, a high number of applications were received in schools in all 
regions. 
Variation in vacancy rates within local authorities
C19 	 Analysis of the School Workforce Census for English local authorities was 
completed in an attempt to assess whether variation in vacancy rates exists within 
local authorities. 
C20 	 Table 3C summarises the results.  This analysis confirms that: 
	 3 per cent of local authorities showed extreme polarity in vacancy rates for 
their schools. The majority of schools show very low vacancy rates, but the 
remainder demonstrate high vacancy rates.25 
	 64 per cent of local authorities have a more even distribution of vacancy rates 
across the schools within their boundaries ranging from schools with very low 
rates to a minority with very high rates. 
	 34 per cent of local authorities appear to have no or very few schools with high 
vacancy rates. 
25 Where the total number of both vacant teacher positions and temporarily filled teacher positions as a percentage of  the number of
full time qualified teachers in each school is greater than 15per cent
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Table 3C: Variation in vacancy rates within local authorities in England
Group Numberof LAs
% of
total 
LAs
Range % of 
high vacancy
schools
Range % of 
no vacancy
schools
Examples
1 4 2.6% 4% - 8% 90% - 95% Salford, Walsall 
2 35 23.0% 1% - 5% 85%- 95% Southwark, Lewisham, Ealing 
3 62 40.8% 1% - 4% 80%– 95% West Berkshire UA, Haringey
4 51 33.6% 0% - 1% 90% - 100% Bury, Middlesbrough UA
Total 152 100.0%
Source: School Workforce Census, November 2010
C21 	 The local authority that appears to have the greatest variety in vacancies is 
Salford, which, despite having no vacancies in over 90 per cent of its schools, has 
several schools with a large number of vacancies.  While Salford is the most 
extreme example of spread of vacancies, Southwark presents a large spread 
across more schools and in a manner that is more typical and more common. It 
has 92 schools, of which 9 (10 per cent) have between 1 per cent and 15 per cent 
vacancies and 4 (4 per cent) have more than 15 per cent vacancies.  This pattern 
of having around 2 to 4 times as many schools in the 1 per cent to 15 per cent 
division as the above 15 per cent division is seen often in local authorities with 
higher spread. While Southwark is the case of this with the most vacancies, there 
are around a dozen that fit this description in the top 20. 
C22 	 This confirms that there is significant variation in vacancy levels within local 
authorities which may be indicative of the challenges that exist at an individual 
school level.   
Vacancy rates across subjects
C23 	 Table 4C uses data from the School Workforce Census in 2010 to illustrate 
national vacancy rates by subject. In line with historical trends, above average 
vacancy rates are seen for maths, IT and English. Although the vacancy rate for 
all sciences is in line with the national average, this masks a shortage of qualified 
chemistry and physics teachers, and an oversupply of biology teachers. By region, 
the highest numbers of vacancies in the core subjects are in London, West 
Midlands, South East and East of England. 
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Table 4C: Full time classroom teacher vacancies in secondary schools in England 
by subject26 
VACANCIES AS A NUMBER OF 
PERCENTAGE OF VACANCIES 
TEACHERS IN POST 
ALL VACANCIES 0.4 630 
MAIN TEACHING SUBJECT
Mathematics 0.7 120 
Information technology 0.5 40 
All sciences 0.4 80 
Languages 0.3 30 
English 0.5 110 
Drama 0.3 10 
History 0.2 10 
Social sciences 0.6 20 
Geography 0.2 10 
Religious education 0.3 10 
Design and technology 0.4 40 
Commercial/business studies 0.5 20 
Art/craft/design 0.2 10 
Music 0.2 10 
Physical education/sport/dance 0.2 30 
Careers - -
Other main and combined subjects 0.5 50 
Unknown subjects .   30 
Source: School Workforce Census – November 2010 
C24 	 While a post in a particular subject may not be vacant, it might not be filled by a 
specialist27 teacher. This is despite evidence from Goldhaber & Brewer 
(Goldhaber & Brewer 1997; 2000) that found pupil achievement gains in maths 
were positively associated with teachers who earned their Master’s in the subject. 
Their research appears to confirm that it is subject knowledge rather than general 
qualification level which is important. Internal analysis considered the number of 
specialist teachers for each of the English Baccalaureate subjects, the proportion 
of hours taught in these subjects by non-specialists, and finally the number of 
additional specialist teachers that would need to be recruited to teach the non­
specialist hours as shown in table 5C. 
26 Definition of vacancies as above. Data collected through the School Workforce Census 2010.
27 A 'specialist' teacher holds a relevant post A-level qualification in the subject taught.
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Table 5C: Specialist teacher in EBacc subjects
Number of additional 
EBacc Subject Number of 'specialist'teachers in subject 
% of hours taught by
'non-specialist' 
'specialist' teachers needed 
to teach the 'non-specialist'
hours 
Maths 24,430 16.4% 4,790 
English  29,140 11.6% 3,824 
Physics    3,860 21.1% 1,032 
Chemistry 4,880 20.2% 1,235 
Biology 7,460 8.8% 720 
Combined/General Science    29,330 10.0% 3,259 
History 11,340 10.4% 1,316 
Geography 9,720 11.2% 1,226 
French 11,270 17.4% 2,374 
German    3,900 22.0% 1,100 
Spanish    3,390 34.3% 1,770 
Other MFL    1,090 64.3% 1,963 
Source: School Workforce Census, November 2010 
C25 	 Table 5C demonstrates a similar pattern of vacancies in science specialists to 
table 4C. Although the vacancy rate for all sciences is in line with the national 
average, one-fifth of the hours taught in chemistry and physics are by a non­
specialist teacher. Table 5C also shows high proportions of non-specialist hours 
for modern foreign languages, although this does not account for the native 
tongue of the teacher28. 
C26 	 Analysis of timetable data from the 2010 School Workforce Census shows that 65 
per cent of maths teachers taught only maths and a further 24 per cent taught one 
other subject, in addition to maths. The most common combinations of subjects 
taught by maths teachers were ‘other’ – information and communications 
technology (ICT), general/combined science, PE, English and citizenship. The 
analysis suggests that ensuring maths teachers exclusively teach maths might go 
some way towards addressing the shortage of specialist teachers in that subject. 
C27 	 Although the total number of full-time vacancies in specialist subjects at secondary 
schools is fairly small, at 630, this may reflect the employment of teachers from 
outside the European Economic Area (EEA) to help fill vacancies and the fact that 
some vacancies are filled by non-qualified teachers. If a school is unable to 
appoint a suitable qualified teacher, besides engaging non-EEA teachers, the 
shortage may be addressed by appointing a teacher without Qualified Teacher
Status (QTS) - an unqualified teacher29- from the resident population or using 
supply teachers to fill the post temporarily. The proportion of non-QTS teachers in 
London has been consistently higher than for England as a whole. Figures from 
the 2010 School Workforce Census show that 6.0 per cent of London teachers are 
unqualified compared to 3.7 per cent of teachers in England overall (this figure 
includes teachers in all publicly-funded settings, whereas previous years only 
covered the maintained sector). The variation in these proportions across England 
can be seen in table 6C. 
28 For the Languages, there is no accounting for the native tongue of the teacher (e.g. a French national without a post-A level 
qualification in ‘French’ would not be counted as a specialist).
29 Unqualified teachers must have appropriate skills and experience to fill the post temporarily until a suitable qualified teacher can be 
appointed. There is also statutory provision for unqualified teachers to teach and undertake an employment based training 
programme which allows them to study for QTS whilst they are employed.
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Table 6C: Non-QTS teachers by region
Region % FTE teachers without QTS 
North East 2.1% 
South West 2.3% 
North West 2.6% 
Yorkshire & The Humber 3.5% 
East Midlands 3.8% 
West Midlands 4.2% 
East of England 4.9% 
Inner London 6.5% 
Outer London 5.6% 
South East 3.8% 
Source: School Workforce Census, November 2010 
C28 	 Table 6C suggests that recruiting qualified teachers in London is more difficult 
than in the rest of the country, which in turn suggests that London schools are 
turning to overseas trained teachers (OTTs), instructors and trainee teachers to fill 
the gap. 
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Annex D: Vacancies, the cost of living, and 
comparisons with the private sector 
D1 	 This annex discusses the relationship between rates of vacancies in classroom 
teacher posts and the cost of living. Using average house prices at a local 
authority level it shows that vacancies tend to be higher in local authorities where 
the cost of living is higher. A similar analysis is undertaken using the ratio of 
classroom teacher pay to private sector pay to show that there is also a 
relationship between this ratio and rates of vacancies.
Vacancies versus house prices and public-private sector 
pay ratios 
D2 	 Figures 1D-6D compare vacancies in local authorities to the ratio of teacher pay to 
professional pay, to house prices and to the ratio of teacher pay to house prices.  
In each defined range on the horizontal axis, 90 per cent of the LAs lie within the 
range of the vertical bars. 50 per cent of the LAs lie within the range of the box. 
The median is the horizontal line within the box.  The figures show that there is a 
relationship between vacancies for classroom teachers and both the local cost of 
living (as approximated by local housing costs) and the ratio of teachers’ pay 
against that for private sector professionals30. This suggests that it is harder to 
recruit and retain teachers in areas where the pay is lower relative to that of 
private sector professionals and where costs of living are higher. 
D3 	 Figure 2D shows the relationship between vacancy rates and the classroom 
teacher to private sector professional pay ratio averaged over the years 2005­
0731. The correlation analysis in table 2D shows that this is significant.  Figure 2D 
shows that in half of the local authorities with a ratio of classroom teacher pay to 
professional teacher pay less than one (i.e. where classroom teachers are paid, 
on average, less than their private sector equivalent) the vacancy rates are higher 
than in the majority of local authorities with a ratio of more than 1.  Figure 1D 
shows a similar plot for the 2009 data which has a smaller sample size. Although 
this plot shows that the median vacancy rate for those local authorities with a ratio 
below 1 is higher than that for those above 1, we are unable to find evidence of a 
significant relationship in this data due to the suppression of small sample sizes. 
D4 	 Figure 3D shows the relationship between vacancy rates and median housing 
prices for the 2009 data. The plot shows an association between higher vacancy 
rates and higher house prices. The correlation analysis in table 1D shows that this 
relationship is significant. This is supported by the 2005-07 data shown in Figure 
4D and again the correlation analysis in table 2D shows that the relationship is 
significant.  However, it should be noted that teachers may live outside the local 
authority in which they work. 
30 Information on the data sources used is included at the end of this annex.
31 The latest vacancy rate data available covers the period 2010-11 and suggest vacancy rates that are particularly low compared 
with earlier years.  This may be explained in part by the favourable economic conditions for teachers during 2010-11.  As we are 
investigating relationships between vacancies and relative pay measures in local authorities, we reasoned that because of the low
rates we would have difficulty discerning relationships using the latest vacancy data.  Instead we are using data for 2005-07 and 2009 
for this analysis as in this period there was greater variation in the vacancy data.
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Figure 5D Figure 6D 
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D5 	 Figure 6D shows the relationship between vacancy rates and the ratio of 
classroom teachers’ pay to median house prices for 2005-07. It shows that in at 
least half of the local authorities where the ratio of classroom teacher pay to 
median house price is higher than 0.15 (the three right-most boxes), the vacancy 
rate is lower than most of the local authorities with a ratio lower than 0.15 (the left-
most box). Figure 5D shows a similar plot for the 2009 data and, again, there is 
evidence of an association between the two variables.  The relationships in the 
two time periods are shown to be significant in the correlations analysis in table 1D 
(2009) and table 2D (2005-07). 
D6 	 Table 1D shows correlation analysis for the 2009 data. Correlations can range 
from -1 to +1 and correlations close to these values indicate a strong correlation. 
Positive and negative correlations imply a positive or inverse relationship. The 
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significances are given by p-values for two-tailed tests in the shaded cells. This is 
the probability of the pattern having arisen by chance. P-values lower than 0.05 
(testing at 5 per cent) are generally regarded as significant, although testing may 
take place at 10 per cent. For example, the correlation between the vacancy rate 
and relative classroom teacher to house price ratio is -0.192; this displays a 
negative relationship meaning higher vacancy rates are associated with lower 
ratios. The p-value is 0.015. As this is below 0.05, this relationship is significant 
when testing at 5 per cent. 
Table 1D: Correlations Matrix32 (2009 data)
VARIABLE Vacancy Rate Median Relative Classroom 
House Price Classroom Teacher 
Teacher to Salary to 
Professional House Price 
Pay Ratio Ratio
Vacancy Rate
Pearson Correlation 
Significance
Number of Observations 
1 0.321 -0.158 -0.192
172 
0.000
171 
0.092
115 
0.015
160 
Median House 
Price 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance
Number of Observations 
0.321 1 -0.348 -0.837
0.000
171 171 
0.000
115 
0.000
160 
Relative CT 
Teacher to 
Professional Pay
Ratio
Pearson Correlation 
Significance
Number of Observations 
-0.158 -0.348 1 0.461
0.092
115 
0.000
115 115 
0.000
115 
CT Teacher Salary
to House Price 
Ratio
Pearson Correlation 
Significance
Number of Observations 
-0.192 -0.837 0.461 1 
0.015
160 
0.000
160 
0.000
115 160 
Scope: England and Wales 2009
Table 2D: Correlations Matrix (2005-07 data)
VARIABLE Vacancy Rate Median 
House Price 
Relative
Classroom 
Teacher to 
Professional 
Pay Ratio 
Classroom 
Teacher 
Salary to 
House Price 
Ratio
Vacancy Rate
Pearson Correlation 
Significance
Number of Observations 
1 0.445 -0.225 -0.377
172 
0.000
171 
0.004
163 
0.000
170 
Median House 
Price 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance
Number of Observations 
0.445 1 -0.408 -0.859
0.000
171 171 
0.000
163 
0.000
170 
Relative CT 
Teacher to 
Professional Pay
Ratio
Pearson Correlation 
Significance
Number of Observations 
-0.225 -0.408 1 0.450
0.004
163 
0.000
163 163 
0.000
163 
CT Teacher Salary
to House Price 
Ratio
Pearson Correlation 
Significance
Number of Observations 
-0.377 -0.859 0.450 1 
0.000
170 
0.000
170 
0.000
163 170 
Scope: England and Wales 2005-07
D7 	 Figure 8D compares the ratio of classroom teacher pay with median house prices 
for 2005-07. It suggests the median value for Inner London, Outer London and 
the Fringe are similar. The salaries of teachers working in the Rest of England and 
There are differing numbers of observations for the different variables used in the correlations analysis because data at local
authority level is suppressed if for any local authority and/or age cohort there are fewer than 100 teachers, or 30 sampled private 
sector professionals.
49 

32 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Wales remain relatively high in respect to this measure of local economic 
conditions. In this latter pay band 90 per cent of the authorities covered have 
ratios that are higher than the majority of those in the London and Fringe pay 
bands. Figure 7D shows a similar pattern for 2009, with slightly higher teacher 
pay to house price ratios as house prices generally fell between 2005-07 and
2009. 
Figure 7D: Box plot to show classroom teacher pay to median house price ratio, 
England and Wales 2009
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Figure 8D: Box plot to show classroom teacher pay to median house price ration, 
England and Wales 2005-07 
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Classroom teacher pay against private sector pay 
D8 	 Figure 10D shows the relative pay of classroom teachers compared to private 
sector professionals for the period of 2005-07 for existing pay bands. This 
illustrates that the relative pay ratio is not equal across all pay band areas. While 
this analysis cannot provide a definitive indication of the extent to which teachers’ 
pay is relatively more or less generous when compared to private sector 
professions, it suggests that: 
 Teachers working in over half of local authorities in Inner London, Outer 
London and the Fringe may be earning relatively lower salaries than private 
sector professionals working in those areas. 
 Teachers working in the Rest of England and Wales teachers are earning 
relatively higher salaries than private sector professionals working in those 
areas. 
D9 	 It should be noted that such benchmark setting is highly speculative and is highly 
sensitive to the choice of comparator professions and the use of average pay to 
make the comparison. It may mask wide variations in local conditions and 
between local authority areas covered by the existing pay bands.  
D10 	 Figure 9D displays the same information for 2009 but uses a smaller number of 
local authorities than for 2005-0733 due to suppressing data for local authorities
with small sample sizes.  It is difficult to compare figures 9D and 10D but it 
suggests that the median ratio for teacher pay relative to private sector 
professions may have reduced between 2005-2007 and 2009 for some pay band 
areas. 
D11 	 A two-year pay freeze for teachers in the maintained sector in England and Wales 
started on 1 September 2011. Incremental progression for teachers continues 
during the pay freeze. This analysis pre-dates the pay freeze during which we 
would expect to see further decline in the ratios.  Further analysis will be required 
to understand the impact of the recession on private sector pay and potential for 
recovery relative to the impact of the pay freeze on teachers’ pay. This analysis 
will be required to make concrete conclusions on the extent of the gap between 
teachers pay relative to the private sector.   
33 Wales is not shown on the 2009 box plot due to small sample sizes of private sector professionals in the Welsh local authorities. In 
this analysis data at local authority level is suppressed if for any local authority and/or age cohort there are fewer than 100 teachers, 
or 30 sampled private sector professionals.
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Figure 9D: Box plot to show classroom teacher to private sector professional pay
 
ratio by pay band, England and Wales 2009 

Box Plot to show Classroom Teacher to Private Sector Professional Pay Ratio
by Pay Band 
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Scope: England & Wales 2009 
Figure 10D: Box plot to show classroom teacher to private sector professional pay 

ration by pay band, England and Wales 2005-07 
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Scope: England & Wales 2005-07 
Variation in relative pay by classroom teacher age
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D12 	 Figures 11D to 14D present comparisons of classroom teachers and professionals 
by age for each pay band. The charts for classroom teacher and professionals are 
broadly consistent in most areas apart from Inner London.    
D13 	 We have undertaken further analysis of teacher to professional pay ratios by age 
bands 20-29, 30-39 and 40-49. For ages 50-59, and 60 and over, there was 
insufficient data. The results (figures 15D–17D34) suggest that there is little 
variation in the results for age groupings 30-39 and 40-49.  For the under 30 age 
group, teachers’ pay was equivalent to, or compared well to, that of private sector 
professionals in Inner London. For the other age groupings, analysis suggests 
that the pay of teachers compared less favourably to that of private sector 
professions.  Given the higher proportion of private sector professionals in the 
under 30 age group relative to those in teaching, and relatively small sample 
sizes, it is difficult to conclude that there are greater or smaller disparities in pay 
between teachers and private sector professionals in the under 30’s age group 
compared to other age groups. Further analysis would be necessary to 
investigate this issue fully.
Figure 11D: The proportion of classroom teachers by age for each pay band, 
England and Wales 2009
The Proportions of Classroom Teachers by Age for each Pay 
Band 
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Figure 12D: The proportion of private sector professional by age for each pay
band, England and Wales 2009
34 Wales is not shown on these box plots due to small sample sizes of private sector professionals in the Welsh local authorities when
the data is split by age band. In this analysis data at local authority level is suppressed if for any local authority and/or age cohort 
there are fewer than 100 teachers, or 30 sampled private sector professionals.
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The Proportion of Private Sector Professionals by Age for each 

Pay Band
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Figure 13D: The proportion of classroom teachers by age for each pay band, 
England and Wales 2005-07 
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Figure 14D: The proportion of private sector professionals by age for each pay
band, England and Wales 2005-07
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Figure 15D: Box plot to show classroom teacher to private sector professional pay 
ratio for the under 30 age group, England 2005-07
Box Plot to show Classroom Teacher to Private sector Professional Pay
Ratio by Under 30s Age Group 
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Figure 16D: Box plot to show classroom teacher to private sector professional pay 
ratio for the 30 to 39 year old age group, England 2005-07 
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Box Plot to show Classroom Teacher to Private sector Professional Pay
Ratio by 30-39 Age Group 
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Figure 17D: Box plot to show classroom teacher to private sector professional pay 
ratio for the 40 to 49 year old age group, England 2005-07
Box Plot to show Classroom Teacher to Private sector Professional Pay
Ratio by 40-49 Age Group 
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Scope: England 2005-2007 
Variation relative to cost of living and to the private sector 
across regions
D14 	 This section investigates how vacancy rates and teacher pay varies relative to the 
cost of living (as represented by house prices) and to private sector professional 
pay at a regional level. Tables 3D and 4D display values by region for the 
variables used in this investigation. 
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D15 	 The results are unsurprising, showing house prices and private sector professional 
salaries are highest in London, followed by the South East.  Average classroom 
teacher salaries are also highest in London, where the current area pay band 
system sets pay, on average, at £4000-£5000 higher than the Rest of England 
and Wales pay band. Average classroom teacher salaries in Wales are second 
highest, despite having both lower house prices and professionals’ pay than 
several other regions, although this could be explained by the higher proportion of 
experienced teachers. 
Table 3D Variables by Region (2005-2007 data) 
Region 
Mean 
Classroom
Teacher Pay (£) 
Mean Private 
Sector
Professional
Pay (£) 
Median House 
Price (£) 
CT Teacher to 
Professional 
Pay Ratio 
Confidence 
interval of CT
to Prof Pay
Ratio 
CT Teacher 
Salary to
House Price 
Ratio 
North East 31,100 27,600 116,300 1.13 +/- 0.02 0.27 
North West 31,100 29,400 126,600 1.06 +/- 0.02 0.25 
Yorkshire and the Humber 30,900 28,700 128,000 1.08 +/- 0.02 0.24 
East Midlands 30,800 28,900 138,000 1.06 +/- 0.02 0.22 
West Midlands 30,900 29,700 141,100 1.04 +/- 0.03 0.22 
East of England 30,900 32,500 179,300 0.95 +/- 0.01 0.17 
London 34,400 42,200 246,700 0.82 +/- 0.01 0.14 
South East 30,700 34,100 205,200 0.90 +/- 0.01 0.15 
South West 30,700 29,400 179,900 1.05 +/- 0.01 0.17 
Wales 31,500 27,000 132,500 1.17 +/- 0.02 0.24 
Scope: England and Wales 2005-07 
Table 4D Variables by Region (2009 data)
Region 
Mean 
Classroom
Teacher Pay (£) 
Mean Private 
Sector
Professional
Pay (£) 
Median House 
Price (£) 
CT Teacher to 
Professional 
Pay Ratio 
Confidence 
interval of CT
to Prof Pay
Ratio 
CT Teacher 
Salary to
House Price 
Ratio 
North East 33,500 29,300 120,000 1.14 +/- 0.05 0.28 
North West 33,300 31,400 130,000 1.06 +/- 0.03 0.26 
Yorkshire and the Humber 32,900 30,700 130,000 1.07 +/- 0.03 0.25 
East Midlands 33,000 32,400 135,000 1.02 +/- 0.03 0.24 
West Midlands 33,200 31,700 142,000 1.05 +/- 0.04 0.23 
East of England 33,200 34,700 175,000 0.96 +/- 0.03 0.19 
London 37,300 46,200 250,000 0.81 +/- 0.02 0.15 
South East 32,800 36,900 203,000 0.89 +/- 0.02 0.16 
South West 33,100 31,800 175,000 1.04 +/- 0.03 0.19 
Wales 34,300 29,800 133,000 1.15 +/- 0.05 0.26 
Scope: England and Wales 2009 
D16 	 The ratio of classroom teacher to private sector professional pay data detailed in 
Table 3D is broadly in line with the public sector pay premia data highlighted in 
HMT evidence to public sector pay review bodies.  The same general pattern of 
London and the South East having the lowest ratios and the North East and Wales 
having the highest is shown when we compare full time equivalent teachers’ pay 
to the pay of graduate professions rather than male teachers’ pay to average male 
earnings. However this DfE data shows the pay of teachers in the East Midlands 
to be much closer to the pay of other private sector graduates than in other 
comparisons. 
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D17 	 The above tables show an average value for this ratio, as well as a confidence
interval35 for the ratio, reflecting that the data is drawn from a sample and there is 
uncertainty around the estimates derived. Table 3D shows an estimated ratio for 
the North East is between 1.11 and 1.15, whereas that for London is between 0.81 
and 0.83. As there is no overlap between these two ranges, we can conclude that 
the ratio for London is statistically significantly different to that of the North East. 
The ratio for the West Midlands lies between 1.01 and 1.07 whereas for the East 
Midlands it is between 1.04 and 1.08. In this case there is an overlap, so we can 
conclude that there is no significant difference between them.  
D18 	 The cost of living as indicated by median house prices in tables 3D and 4D 
generally shows London, the South East and the East as having higher price 
levels, whereas northern regions have the lowest. House pricing data has been 
used as it is the only pricing data available at local authority level. 
Variation across local authorities 
D19 	 Further analysis was completed at a local authority level to try and ascertain the 
extent to which variation existed between local authorities within the existing pay 
bands. Table 5D summarises the following details for all available local authorities:  
a) The ratio of classroom teacher pay to the pay of private sector professionals 
working in the local authorities (local authority based ratio).
b) A confidence interval for that ratio.
c) The ratio of classroom teacher pay to the pay of private sector professionals 
working in the region (regional based ratio). 
d) The ratio of classroom teacher pay to average house prices in the local 
authority appropriate. 
e) The ratio of classroom teacher pay to average house prices in the region. 
f) Vacancy rates.
D20 	 Two different measures of relative pay between teachers and private sector 
professional comparator groups were considered.  One makes a comparison at a 
local authority level where sample sizes allow this.  The confidence interval is 
provided to reflect the uncertainty around this estimate, which arises from the fact 
it is based on a small sample size. The second indicator compares the pay of 
teachers with an average of private sector graduate professions for the region in 
which the local authority belongs. This method attempts to account for any 
potential uneven distribution of other graduate professions that may exist at local 
authority level and to reflect the fact that individuals may be willing to travel across 
local authority boundaries to work. However, it is important to note that neither of 
these approaches can account for the fact that individuals are likely to travel to 
work across regional boundaries.
D21 	 Local authorities with values in the top 25 per cent (upper quartile) of the 
distributions obtained are highlighted in green and those in the bottom 25 per cent 
(lower quartile) are highlighted in red in table 5D.   
35 The 95 per cent confidence interval of the ratio is the range in which if you took 20 samples from the population, you would expect
19 of the samples to give a ratio within that range.  For example, for North Yorkshire, when taking a sample of professionals we are 
confident that the classroom teacher to professional pay ratio will be between 1.05 and 1.15 for 19 out of every 20 samples taken.
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D22 	 This analysis confirms that the conclusions reached earlier that teachers working 
in local authorities closer to London earn relatively lower salaries with respect to 
cost of living, as represented by house prices, compared to those in the Rest of 
England and Wales pay bands where teachers broadly tend to earn relatively 
higher salaries with respect to the cost of living. There are, however, some 
exceptions within the Rest of England where some local authorities in the South 
East and South West demonstrate high cost of living ratios. 
D23 	 In addition, it provides an indication of those authorities in which teachers pay 
appears higher or lower relative to private sector professions in those areas. The 
pay ratio at a regional level in table 5D indicates that all London local authorities 
are within the upper quartile for the regional relative pay ratio.  This suggests that 
their pay does not compare favourably with private sector professionals working in 
London. The analysis does, however, suggest that there is variation in the extent 
to which this applies within London, with some local authorities within Inner 
London, such Lambeth and Tower Hamlets, showing lower ratios than others. This 
suggests that within the pay band some disparities also exist.
D24 	 The table also highlights other authorities outside of the London and Fringe pay 
band where teachers’ pay seems low relative to private sector professions. Other 
potential “hotspots” to consider would be those that have both regional and local 
authority level ratios that suggest teacher pay is less than other professions, for 
example parts of the South East region, such as Southampton, Portsmouth, Milton 
Keynes, Reading and Hampshire 
D25 	 The analysis also highlights local authorities with a higher ratio of teachers’ pay 
relative to the regional average for private sector professions.  These are 
authorities where pay levels for teachers appear generous relative to private 
sector professions. 
D26 	 It should be noted that this analysis is illustrative only and can not control for all 
factors that may drive differences in local market conditions and affect the 
comparison of teacher pay with that of private sector professionals. For the 
reasons described earlier, the analysis makes no judgement on the efficiency of 
the salaries paid, just that a disparity exists.  Further work to understand changes 
in private sector pay resulting from the recession would need to be considered 
before such a judgement could be made. 
Data sources
D27 	 Data on the pay of teachers is available from the Database of Teacher Records 
(DTR) and the 2010 School Workforce Census. There are two alternative datasets 
for data on the pay of comparator groups: a) Labour Force Survey (LFS) and b) 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).  Each dataset has its own 
advantages and limitations36. ASHE was chosen as the most appropriate source 
of data for comparison with classroom teachers pay.   
D28 	 Comparisons were restricted to the following private sector professional 
occupations from ASHE: 
a) Group 2: Professional occupations; and 
b) Group 3: Associate professional and technical occupations.  
36 The ASHE data is an annual 1per cent sample survey of the population, whereas the LFS is a quarterly survey. The ASHE data is 
considered a more reliable source but doesn’t include variables such as qualifications, which are included in the LFS. However, the 
LFS isn’t a large enough dataset to break down to local authority level and can only provide robust results at regional or sub regional 
level. As analysis is required at the finest geographical detail possible, we are constrained to using ASHE data.
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D29 	 Analysis of the Higher Education Institutes’ data on the destination of graduates 
provides information on the employment of full time, first degree graduates by 
standard occupational group six months after graduating for the 2006/7 to 2009/10 
cohorts. After three and a half years, 37 per cent of the 2006/7 cohort were in 
professional occupations and 30 per cent were in associate professional and 
technical occupations. Given the two ASHE groups selected represent two thirds 
of graduates we have concluded that these are the most appropriate comparison 
groups. 
60 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
Table 5D: Vacancies, pay and house prices in Local Authorities in England and
Wales (2005-07 data)37 
LA Name Region Pay band 
Relative
Classroom 
Teacher to 
Professional 
Pay Ratio 
95%
Confidence
interval of CT
to Prof Pay
Ratio 
Relative CT 
Pay (LA) to 
Professional
Pay (Region) 
Ratio 
CT Salary to 
House Price 
Ratio 
CT Pay (LA) to 
House Price 
(Region) Ratio 
Vacancy Rate 
City of London London A n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.0% 
Brent London A 1.39 +/- 0.07 0.88 0.14 0.15 1.2% 
Barking and Dagenham London A 1.10 +/- 0.09 0.86 0.20 0.15 0.7% 
Lewisham London A 1.17 
1.27 
1.17 
1.13 
+/- 0.13 
+/- 0.11 
+/- 0.07 
+/- 0.1 
0.86 0.17 0.15 1.0% 
Haringey London A 0.85 0.14 0.15 1.8% 
Greenwich London A 0.85 0.16 0.14 1.8% 
Newham London A 0.82 0.15 0.14 1.8% 
Merton London A 1.14 +/- 0.08 0.83 0.14 0.14 1.1% 
Ealing London A 1.06 +/- 0.06 0.84 0.13 0.14 0.9% 
Camden London A 0.95 +/- 0.04 0.88 0.09 0.15 0.9% 
Southwark London A 0.98 +/- 0.05 0.84 0.13 0.14 0.1% 
Hackney London A 0.86 +/- 0.07 0.85 0.14 0.15 0.8% 
Tower Hamlets London A 0.73 +/- 0.04 0.86 0.13 0.15 0.7% 
Islington London A 0.86 +/- 0.03 0.85 0.11 0.15 2.3% 
Wandsworth London A 0.92 +/- 0.13 0.84 0.10 0.14 2.1% 
Hammersmith and Fulham London A 0.93 +/- 0.06 0.83 0.09 0.14 1.4% 
Kensington and Chelsea London A 0.96 +/- 0.1 0.79 0.05 0.14 1.0% 
Lambeth London A 0.67 +/- 0.07 0.82 0.13 0.14 1.8% 
Westminster London A 0.79 +/- 0.03 0.82 0.07 0.14 2.3% 
Havering London B 1.20 +/- 0.07 0.81 0.16 0.14 1.0% 
Waltham Forest London B 1.13 +/- 0.14 0.79 0.14 0.13 1.7% 
Enfield London B 1.06 +/- 0.06 0.79 0.15 0.14 0.7% 
Bexley London B 1.02 +/- 0.08 0.78 0.16 0.13 1.5% 
Croydon London B 1.02 +/- 0.06 0.77 0.15 0.13 1.1% 
Redbridge London B 1.02 +/- 0.2 0.79 0.14 0.14 0.4% 
Sutton London B 1.00 +/- 0.06 0.77 0.15 0.13 0.7% 
Harrow London B 0.95 +/- 0.1 0.79 0.12 0.14 0.8% 
Bromley London B 0.95 +/- 0.08 0.79 0.13 0.13 0.6% 
Kingston upon Thames London B 0.99 +/- 0.07 0.78 0.12 0.13 1.0% 
Hounslow London B 0.88 +/- 0.05 0.78 0.13 0.13 1.0% 
Barnet London B 0.93 +/- 0.11 0.78 0.12 0.13 0.1% 
Hillingdon London B 0.85 +/- 0.03 0.77 0.14 0.13 2.3% 
Richmond upon Thames London B 0.94 +/- 0.07 0.76 0.09 0.13 1.8% 
Thurrock East of England C 1.09 +/- 0.09 0.96 0.19 0.17 1.2% 
Slough South East C 0.83 +/- 0.05 0.91 0.17 0.15 1.4% 
Bracknell Forest South East C 0.78 +/- 0.05 0.91 0.15 0.15 0.5% 
Windsor and Maidenhead South East C 0.74 +/- 0.08 0.92 0.11 0.15 0.5% 
Surrey South East C 0.81 +/- 0.03 0.90 0.12 0.15 0.6% 
Essex East of England C/D 0.95 +/- 0.02 0.96 0.16 0.17 0.5% 
Hertfordshire East of England C/D 0.89 +/- 0.02 0.95 0.14 0.17 1.1% 
Kent South East C/D 1.04 +/- 0.03 0.91 0.17 0.15 0.8% 
West Sussex South East C/D 1.03 +/- 0.04 0.90 0.15 0.15 0.5% 
Buckinghamshire South East C/D 0.91 +/- 0.04 0.91 0.13 0.15 1.0% 
Rutland East Midlands D n/a n/a 1.06 0.15 0.22 0.4% 
Leicester East Midlands D 1.15 +/- 0.05 1.06 0.25 0.22 0.4% 
Derbyshire East Midlands D 1.14 +/- 0.05 1.07 0.23 0.22 0.4% 
Nottinghamshire East Midlands D 1.09 +/- 0.04 1.07 0.24 0.22 0.1% 
Northamptonshire East Midlands D 1.07 +/- 0.04 1.08 0.21 0.23 0.4% 
Lincolnshire East Midlands D 1.19 +/- 0.05 1.04 0.22 0.22 0.4% 
Nottingham East Midlands D 0.97 +/- 0.05 1.06 0.28 0.22 0.7% 
Derby East Midlands D 0.98 +/- 0.03 1.05 0.24 0.22 0.2% 
Leicestershire East Midlands D 1.01 +/- 0.05 1.06 0.20 0.22 0.3% 
Southend-on-Sea East of England D 1.24 +/- 0.12 0.96 0.19 0.17 1.1% 
Suffolk East of England D 1.09 +/- 0.05 0.96 0.19 0.17 0.7% 
Norfolk East of England D 1.10 +/- 0.04 0.95 0.20 0.17 0.9% 
Peterborough East of England D 1.03 +/- 0.06 0.93 0.23 0.17 0.4% 
Bedfordshire East of England D 1.04 +/- 0.06 0.96 0.19 0.17 0.8% 
Luton East of England D 0.77 +/- 0.06 0.93 0.20 0.17 1.3% 
Cambridgeshire East of England D 0.89 +/- 0.03 0.93 0.16 0.17 0.5% 
37 Confidence intervals were initially calculated based on the unweighted means.  However the means shown in the table have been 
weighted to represent a higher proportion of the population.  To derive a confidence interval for the weighted means we calculated the 
distance either side of the unweighted mean as a percentage of the unweighted mean, and applied this percentage to the weighted
mean. Local authority data has been suppressed (indicated by “n/a”) where the sample size is less than 100 for professional pay and 
less than 30 for classroom teacher pay.
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LA Name Region Pay band 
Relative
Classroom 
Teacher to 
Professional 
Pay Ratio 
95%
Confidence 
interval of CT
to Prof Pay
Ratio 
Relative CT
Pay (LA) to 
Professional 
Pay (Region) 
Ratio 
CT Salary to
House Price 
Ratio 
CT Pay (LA) to
House Price 
(Region) Ratio 
Vacancy Rate 
Hartlepool North East D n/a n/a 1.12 0.35 0.27 0.4% 
South Tyneside North East D 1.36 +/- 0.12 1.16 0.29 0.28 0.3% 
Darlington North East D 1.20 +/- 0.09 1.14 0.27 0.27 0.1% 
Middlesbrough North East D 1.15 +/- 0.13 1.12 0.32 0.27 0.3% 
Durham North East D 1.12 +/- 0.06 1.12 0.30 0.27 0.5% 
Northumberland North East D 1.26 +/- 0.08 1.12 0.23 0.27 0.0% 
Redcar and Cleveland North East D 1.09 +/- 0.11 1.12 0.27 0.27 0.7% 
Sunderland North East D 1.08 +/- 0.07 1.11 0.28 0.26 0.6% 
Stockton on Tees North East D 1.10 +/- 0.06 1.13 0.25 0.27 0.6% 
Newcastle upon Tyne North East D 1.12 +/- 0.06 1.15 0.22 0.27 0.5% 
North Tyneside North East D 1.13 +/- 0.12 1.12 0.23 0.26 0.3% 
Gateshead North East D 1.05 +/- 0.07 1.12 0.26 0.26 0.6% 
Blackburn with Darwen North West D 1.19 +/- 0.08 1.06 0.35 0.25 0.6% 
Cumbria North West D 1.25 +/- 0.06 1.07 0.24 0.25 0.2% 
Sefton North West D 1.27 +/- 0.12 1.08 0.21 0.25 0.0% 
Bolton North West D 1.16 +/- 0.11 1.06 0.27 0.24 0.0% 
Liverpool North West D 1.07 +/- 0.07 1.08 0.27 0.25 0.3% 
Salford North West D 1.19 +/- 0.09 1.06 0.26 0.24 0.6% 
Tameside North West D 1.26 +/- 0.1 1.05 0.26 0.24 0.4% 
Blackpool North West D 1.38 +/- 0.13 1.03 0.27 0.24 0.5% 
Wigan North West D 1.08 +/- 0.08 1.06 0.27 0.25 0.3% 
Lancashire North West D 1.06 +/- 0.11 1.07 0.26 0.25 0.5% 
Rochdale North West D 1.19 +/- 0.1 1.03 0.28 0.24 0.5% 
St Helens North West D 1.05 +/- 0.13 1.07 0.26 0.25 0.3% 
Bury North West D 1.04 +/- 0.12 1.08 0.25 0.25 0.1% 
Wirral North West D 1.14 +/- 0.1 1.06 0.23 0.24 1.0% 
Stockport North West D 1.11 +/- 0.05 1.07 0.20 0.25 0.6% 
Oldham North West D 1.10 +/- 0.1 1.03 0.28 0.24 0.4% 
Knowsley North West D 0.99 +/- 0.12 1.06 0.26 0.25 0.5% 
Manchester North West D 0.95 +/- 0.03 1.08 0.24 0.25 0.0% 
Warrington North West D 1.13 +/- 0.07 1.04 0.21 0.24 0.2% 
Halton North West D 0.99 +/- 0.09 1.04 0.26 0.24 0.4% 
Cheshire North West D 1.00 +/- 0.03 1.04 0.19 0.24 0.2% 
Trafford North West D 1.02 +/- 0.05 1.04 0.17 0.24 0.7% 
Medway South East D 1.15 +/- 0.08 0.90 0.21 0.15 0.8% 
Isle of Wight South East D 1.29 +/- 0.11 0.89 0.18 0.15 0.7% 
Brighton and Hove South East D 1.12 +/- 0.07 0.92 0.15 0.15 0.6% 
East Sussex South East D 1.05 +/- 0.07 0.89 0.16 0.15 0.6% 
Portsmouth South East D 0.83 +/- 0.06 0.89 0.21 0.15 0.7% 
Reading South East D 0.90 +/- 0.05 0.90 0.16 0.15 1.1% 
West Berkshire South East D 0.90 +/- 0.04 0.92 0.14 0.15 0.8% 
Southampton South East D 0.80 +/- 0.09 0.88 0.19 0.15 0.6% 
Hampshire South East D 0.91 +/- 0.02 0.90 0.15 0.15 0.4% 
Oxfordshire South East D 0.96 +/- 0.04 0.89 0.14 0.15 0.9% 
Milton Keynes South East D 0.89 +/- 0.04 0.87 0.18 0.14 0.9% 
Wokingham South East D 0.70 +/- 0.05 0.91 0.12 0.15 0.4% 
Isles of Scilly South West D n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.1% 
Plymouth South West D 1.16 +/- 0.05 1.06 0.22 0.17 0.3% 
Torbay South West D 1.46 +/- 0.2 1.06 0.19 0.17 0.5% 
Cornwall South West D 1.28 +/- 0.06 1.06 0.17 0.17 0.1% 
Gloucestershire South West D 1.10 +/- 0.03 1.07 0.18 0.17 0.6% 
Devon South West D 1.21 +/- 0.04 1.04 0.16 0.17 0.2% 
Somerset South West D 1.10 +/- 0.04 1.06 0.18 0.17 0.1% 
Bournemouth South West D 1.03 +/- 0.09 1.06 0.17 0.17 0.0% 
Wiltshire South West D 1.11 +/- 0.04 1.03 0.16 0.17 0.4% 
Poole South West D 1.02 +/- 0.08 1.05 0.15 0.17 0.4% 
Dorset South West D 1.00 +/- 0.05 1.05 0.14 0.17 0.2% 
Bath and North East Somerset South West D 1.02 +/- 0.07 1.05 0.14 0.17 0.2% 
City of Bristol South West D 0.97 +/- 0.04 1.02 0.18 0.17 0.5% 
Swindon South West D 0.91 +/- 0.04 1.01 0.20 0.16 0.8% 
South Gloucestershire South West D 0.91 +/- 0.04 1.03 0.17 0.17 0.2% 
North Somerset South West D 0.79 +/- 0.17 1.04 0.17 0.17 0.2% 
Merthyr Tydfil Wales D n/a n/a 1.20 0.36 0.24 0.0% 
Blaenau Gwent Wales D n/a n/a 1.16 0.38 0.24 0.5% 
Ceredigion Wales D n/a n/a 1.17 0.18 0.24 0.1% 
Powys Wales D n/a n/a 1.17 0.19 0.24 1.3% 
Isle of Anglesey Wales D n/a n/a 1.19 0.21 0.24 0.4% 
Rhondda Cynon Taff Wales D 1.35 +/- 0.11 1.18 0.34 0.24 1.2% 
Bridgend Wales D 1.37 +/- 0.13 1.19 0.26 0.24 0.2% 
Carmarthenshire Wales D 1.43 +/- 0.16 1.18 0.24 0.24 0.9% 
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LA Name Region Pay band 
Relative
Classroom 
Teacher to 
Professional 
Pay Ratio 
95%
Confidence 
interval of CT
to Prof Pay
Ratio 
Relative CT
Pay (LA) to 
Professional 
Pay (Region) 
Ratio 
CT Salary to
House Price 
Ratio 
CT Pay (LA) to
House Price 
(Region) Ratio 
Vacancy Rate 
Stoke-on-Trent West Midlands D 1.29 +/- 0.09 1.01 
1.05 
0.35 
0.26 
0.21 
0.22 
0.6% 
1.2% Wolverhampton West Midlands D 1.13 +/- 0.06 
Shropshire West Midlands D 1.13 +/- 0.09 1.06 0.18 0.22 0.4% 
Walsall West Midlands D 1.10 +/- 0.1 1.03 0.25 0.22 0.6% 
Staffordshire West Midlands D 1.12 +/- 0.07 1.04 0.22 0.22 0.3% 
Dudley West Midlands D 1.06 +/- 0.12 1.05 0.24 0.22 0.5% 
Coventry West Midlands D 0.99 +/- 0.04 1.06 0.25 0.22 0.6% 
Birmingham West Midlands D 1.03 +/- 0.03 1.05 0.23 0.22 0.9% 
Telford & Wrekin West Midlands D 1.05 +/- 0.06 1.03 0.24 0.22 0.3% 
Worcestershire West Midlands D 1.14 +/- 0.06 1.03 0.18 0.22 0.5% 
Herefordshire West Midlands D 1.16 +/- 0.1 1.03 0.17 0.22 0.1% 
Sandwell West Midlands D 0.78 +/- 0.48 1.03 0.26 0.22 0.7% 
Warwickshire West Midlands D 0.99 +/- 0.03 1.03 0.18 0.22 0.5% 
Solihull West Midlands D 0.92 +/- 0.05 1.01 0.15 0.21 1.1% 
Doncaster Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.15 +/- 0.08 1.09 0.27 0.24 0.5% 
Kirklees Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.19 +/- 0.05 1.09 0.24 0.24 0.4% 
North East Lincolnshire Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.22 +/- 0.12 1.06 0.31 0.24 0.9% 
Bradford Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.14 +/- 0.05 1.08 0.26 0.24 1.1% 
Sheffield Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.12 +/- 0.04 1.09 0.25 0.24 0.7% 
Kingston-Upon-Hull, City of Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.12 +/- 0.07 1.06 0.36 0.24 0.7% 
North Lincolnshire Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.02 +/- 0.09 1.08 0.27 0.24 0.6% 
East Riding of Yorkshire Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.14 +/- 0.09 1.07 0.22 0.24 0.2% 
Calderdale Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.06 +/- 0.08 1.08 0.25 0.24 0.4% 
Rotherham Yorkshire and the Humber D 0.99 +/- 0.06 1.09 0.26 0.24 0.9% 
Wakefield Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.06 +/- 0.06 1.06 0.25 0.24 0.2% 
North Yorkshire Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.10 +/- 0.05 1.08 0.18 0.24 0.2% 
Barnsley Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.04 +/- 0.09 1.05 0.27 0.23 0.9% 
York Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.08 +/- 0.06 1.08 0.18 0.24 0.2% 
Leeds Yorkshire and the Humber D 1.00 +/- 0.06 1.08 0.22 0.24 0.2% 
Pay band code: 
A: Inner London
B: Outer London 
C: The Fringe
C/D Part of LA in the Fringe; part in Rest of England  
D: Rest of England and Wales
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Annex E: International evidence 
E1 	 This annex summarises the international evidence around reform of teachers’ pay, 
and in particular the evidence of attempts to better relate teachers’ pay to their 
performance. 
E2 	 Research by Ma, Battu and Elliot in 2009 found consensus in the research 
literature that pay plays an important role in the recruitment of teachers.  Although 
pay is not the main or only motivation for teaching, it seems that unless the school 
system offers salaries in line with other graduate salaries, the same people do not 
enter teaching. 
E3 	 International studies have found positive effects of financial incentives on teacher 
performance. OECD suggest that education systems such as Finland and Ontario 
have granted significantly more discretion over the allocation of resources to 
school heads and school faculties (OECD 2009).  This is something the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) shows to be closely 
related to school performance when combined with appropriate accountability
arrangements. 
E4 	 According to Barber and Mourshed (2007), there is strong competition for entry 
into teacher training in countries where teaching has high social status (e.g. 
Finland & Korea). They argue that making entry to teacher training highly selective 
raises the status of the profession, which in turn attracts high quality graduates. 
Once teaching becomes a high-status profession, more talented people will 
become teachers, lifting the status of the profession even higher.
United States
E5 	 There is some evidence from the United States that making teacher pay more 
closely related to performance can have a positive effect on pupil attainment.  A 
randomised trial of a PRP scheme in Tennessee – the Tennessee Career Ladder 
– found that pupils taught by teachers participating in the scheme had 3 per cent 
higher maths scores than pupils taught by non participating teachers (Dee et al, 
2004). 
E6 	 Further, Figlio and Kenny (2007), in a cross-sectional study of 502 schools across 
the US, found that the use of PRP schemes were correlated with higher test 
scores of between 1.3 and 2.1 points – three times the impact of maternal 
education levels on pupil test scores.  Other things being equal, students 
apparently learned more in schools where there was a wide range in wages for 
teachers with a specified mix of schooling and experience, or where small 
numbers of teachers received targeted bonuses or raises.  The relationship was 
found to be strongest in schools serving lower-income populations.  The estimated 
gains in test scores associated with the judicious use of salary incentives were 
modest (though they were comparable to those associated with other variables 
highlighted in the literature).   
E7 	 However, the authors point out that this evidence of a positive association 
between merit pay and student performance is not evidence of causation and 
should therefore be interpreted with caution.  It could, for example, reflect students 
receiving a better education in schools in which the use of merit pay is correlated 
with more innovation in teaching, and in which higher student achievement is due 
to the innovation in teaching but not to use of merit pay.  A controlled experiment 
would be necessary to obtain estimates of the causal effects of the use of 
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individual teacher incentives on student achievement. They also warn that, 
although there is a relation between test scores and merit pay targeted to a few, 
there is no association between student performance and indiscriminate merit pay. 
Figure 1E: Percentage of Pr ivate (blue) and Charter (red) Schools considering 
factors in determining initia l salaries and salary growth 
E8 Charter and private schools in the US are exempted from many state regulations 
and are freed from collective bargaining agreements unless the school chooses to 
unionise. Charter and private schools are more likely than district schools to tie 
some portion of teachers’ pay to performance and a significant number also use 
higher pay to fill hard-to-staff positions (Reed, 2010). In nearly 50 per cent of both 
charter and private schools, individual teacher performance is a consideration in 
salary increases. Just over 30 per cent of private schools and 25 per cent of 
charter schools reported using school-wide performance bonuses. Fewe  than 40 
per cent of charter schools and 30 per cent of private schools did not reward 
teachers for earning extra degrees and credits, and more than 30 per cent of 
charter schools did not base salary growth on experience. There is signifi cant 
evidence to show how schools have used this flexibility, although very little to 
show any impact of this on outcomes at this stage. 
Sweden
E9 In 1995, as part of Sweden’s broader effort to decentralise its schooling system, its
centrally agreed salary scheme for teachers with fixed pay ladders was replaced 
by an individual based pay system determined locally (Strath, 2004, Ladd, 2007). 
The only area that retained a central agreement was a minimum starting salary 
and a guaranteed wage increase during the first five years. There was initial union 
hostility to the reforms, with a survey showing less than one third of members of 
the largest teacher union in favour of the reforms in 1999. This doubled to more
than 60 per cent of members in favour in 2006. 
E10	 As a result of the reforms, salaries became negotiated according to teacher 
characteristics (for example, secondary versus primary), the labour market 
situation (with teachers in shortage areas able to negotiate higher salaries), the 
performance of the teacher, and the range of the teacher’s responsibilities. Pay is 
agreed when a new teacher is hired and then revised annually. Pay can be set 
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either through direct dialogue between the teacher and the head teacher or 
through negotiations between head teachers and local trade unions. There is also 
a mixed model in which pay is set at an individual school level, but with union 
involvement in making sure that the pay review is conducted in a fair manner. The 
latest study showed that more schools were moving towards the first model, but 
that at that time, one third used the first model, one third the second model and 
one third the mixed model. 
E11 	 Strath suggested there was evidence to show that teachers generally preferred to 
negotiate their salary increases without the involvement of the local union. There 
is as yet no consideration of whether either model was cheaper or led to better 
outcomes. Evidence on the impact of the reform was limited, but available studies 
suggested that: 
 Despite expectations to the contrary the spread between the pay of the 
bottom 10 per cent and the upper 10 per cent has decreased. Other factors 
cited that may have contributed to this included: the demand for teachers 
exceeding the supply of teachers in recent years, thus forcing many 
municipalities to increase the entry-level salary for teachers (indeed the 
differences between starting teachers were larger than between 
experienced teachers); and a prevailing culture of egalitarianism in Sweden 
which works against pay dispersion (Bjorklund, 2007). 
 Individualised pay has reduced teacher shortages in certain geographical 
areas where the teacher shortage has been most pronounced (the largest 
cities and most rural areas), and where the entry-level salaries for teachers 
have been close to 50 per cent higher than in municipalities at the bottom of 
the salary scale. However, the ability of a locality to make salary 
adjustments depends on its own economic situation. Notably, poor localities 
can compete effectively for teachers only with the help of central 
government grants (Ladd, 2007). 
 There is some limited evidence that the reforms have made it easier to 
reward and retain committed teachers and to assess where teachers are 
not performing up to the standards (Strath).  
 The new pay system provides teachers with an incentive to compete for a 
higher wage at another school. In fact, there are some indications that the 
recent school reforms have resulted in a higher mobility within the 
education sector.  The probability of teachers changing municipalities was 
twice as large in 2000 as in the 1990s. 
E12 	 Strath suggests that the following key lessons can be learnt from the Swedish
experience: 
 One important outcome of introducing performance based pay is that in 
order to define teacher performance criteria, municipalities and schools 
were forced to think explicitly about what the school should achieve and 
what should be expected of teachers. 
 However the individualised pay scheme seems to have functioned primarily 
as a labour market instrument rather than as a way of rewarding teachers 
on the basis of their performance. This suggests that where there is a 
countrywide shortage of teachers, competition on the basis of salary may 
amount to a zero sum game. 
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 A significant issue in implementing individualised or performance based pay 
is the availability of resources. With limited resources there is a great risk 
that the system will lose credibility, especially if the ability to pay teachers 
varies across municipalities or if a municipality or school has to deal with 
teacher shortages whilst also using financial incentives to reward teacher 
effectiveness. 
 Moves to individualised pay agreements put significant pressure on the job 
of the head teacher, with new skills needed to provide honest feedback and 
sufficient arguments when negotiating salaries. 
 Active involvement by the unions in assuring that the process is carried out 
correctly is probably an important prerequisite for a smooth transition from a 
fixed pay ladder to a performance based pay system. 
E13	 According to Wolf (2010), Swedish ‘free schools’ do not as a rule utilise the 
freedoms that they have to set individual salaries. But they do ‘operate with 
working hours and conditions which are often very different from the state sector, 
including expectations of teachers’ involvement in extra-curricular activities and 
administration’. 
E14	 OECD’s February 2011 report ‘Evaluation and Assessment Frameworks for 
Improving School Outcomes found that Sweden’s individualised pay system 
means that employers and school leaders can potentially make salary decisions 
contingent on evidence of good performance. In practice, however, salary 
differences are often determined on the basis of effort and commitment rather than 
achievement of stated objectives. 
E15 	 OECD reports that the individual-based pay system has been a significant step 
towards greater flexibility in the management of teacher careers and a closer 
linkage between teacher performance and reward. It has the important advantage 
that schools can potentially reward effective teachers, including with better pay. It 
also allows schools to better value those competencies that best fit their needs. 
However, important aspects of its implementation such as the way the 
performance of teachers is assessed and what the system actually rewards (e.g. 
commitment or labour market position instead of performance) do raise concerns 
about the ability of the individual-based pay system to actually provide teachers 
with the incentives to improve their performance without appropriate support and 
governance arrangements.  
E16 	 The OECD review team (reported in OECD review of Sweden, 2011) met with 
some school leaders who had little time to perform classroom observation and to 
engage in a closer analysis of teacher performance.  The consequence was that 
performance did not receive much weight in the salary decision. In addition, it is 
clear that no consistency in teacher appraisal can be assured across schools and 
municipalities as methodologies used are different and each school leader gives 
distinct importance to performance as a factor to influence teacher pay. 
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